Abstract
Substantialism is the view that form or soul is a thing. A ‘thing’ is the type of entity that makes up the reference of a sortal or count-noun expression, the kind of expression that divides its reference among discrete, countable particulars. Things are the types of entities that provide the subjects of first-order properties or typically provide the values of the variables of first-order predicate logic. A variety of substantialist interpretations is possible. But it is difficult to find representatives of each variety today, and substantialism remains decidedly a minority view. There have been, however, some recent additions to its ranks from among younger scholars (such as J. Whiting and C. Shields), which may indicate that interest in it is on the rise.
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References
If we go back a few years candidates are available: e.g., T. J. Slakey (1961: 470) holds that in the De Anima Aristotle `tries to explain perception simply as an event in the sense-organs’; W. I. Matson (1966: 93) says that the ancient Greeks took for granted `mind-body identity’ and that there is no denial in the whole of Greek literature of the view `that sensing is a bodily process throughout’.
Wiggins (1967: 47) recognizes the importance of the subjecthood of form for the case for its thinghood. Charlton (1970: 70, 72) acknowledges the importance of subjecthood and of particularity. Irwin (1988: 218) too stresses the importance of subjecthood in his case for Aristotle’s substantialism, and Shields (1988b) devotes a whole article to subjecthood, which is considered in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this chapter.
In spite of the recent dates of Frede’s article (1985) and his commentary with Patzig on Zeta (1988), his views on the particularity of form have been in circulation for awhile, as is indicated in one of the notes in his article (1985: 26), in which he maintains that he first aired his views on the particularity of form in a presentation in 1972. Frede is perhaps behind the more recent enthusiasm for the particularity of form exhibited by a number of scholars in the last few years, although contemporary interest in the topic probably commenced with R. Albritton’s paper of 1957, `Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’,which raised with detailed arguments, but left undecided, the question of the particularity of form. Albritton (1957) considers the case for and against the particularity of form, in response to W. Sellars (1957: 691), who thinks that there is no question about the particularity of form. Albritton, who largely limits his considerations to passages from the Metaphysics,leaves the question of particularity undecided. But, in contrast with Sellars, who conceives of particularity in terms of thinghood, Albritton conceives of the question of the particularity of form in terms of tropes, and thus in terms of attributivism. He makes this clear when he maintains that, for example, if a particular sphere were to possess its form as a particular, then `the thing is a sphere, and its particular form a sphericity, namely its sphericity’ (1957: 701). Belief, however, in the particularity of the forms of Aristotle’s natural philosophy is an ancient one, and A. C. Lloyd (1981: 4 f.) in his own argument for their particularity also argues for the antiquity of his own interpretation by locating it in the ancient commentators.
Albritton (1957: 707) treats the passage as central to any effort to defend the particularity of form, since it is the only place in which Aristotle explicitly states `a general theory of particular forms’.
See n. 4 of Chapter 2 for the meaning of tode ti.
When Lloyd (1981) argues for the particularity of form, he may be arguing as a substantialist. This is, however, a qualified judgment of Lloyd, because he is concerned primarily with the mere particularity of form, rather than with its ontological category as a thing or as a property, and because the condensation of his argument in his short monograph leaves open too many questions about how to read him. Lloyd (1981: 47) seems, however, to construe `universal’ in terms of the notion of property, and in denying the universality of form he would seem to deny it any attributive character (1981: 41). It is, however, clear that Lloyd (1981: 8, 31) identifies `predicability’ with Aristotle’s idea of universality, and he certainly denies the predicability of `substantial form’, the kind of form that is the essence of a thing (1981: 28). Predicability would seem to be tantamount to attributability, and thus the denial of the predicability of substantial form would be the denial of its attributability.
See Frede and Patzig (1988, i. 52–57) for a survey of the evidence for the particularity and universality of form. See also the comments on the universality of form in Chapter 2, 16 f.
A goodly portion of what is said in this section on `subjecthood’ is drawn from Granger (1995a) and (1995b). Shields (1995) replies to the criticisms of his views on subjecthood as they are presented in Granger (1995a).
Differentiae, such as `footed’ and `two-footed’, are properties that are not accidents, nor are they secondary substances, since they are properties. They are not ‘in’ substances, but they are the only items other than secondary substances which are `said of’ their substantial subjects (Cat. 3’21–28).
Not everyone, however, would agree that the particular substance of the Cat. is what becomes the composite substance of the hylomorphic doctrine of the Met. Frede and Patzig (1988, i. 38 and ii. 38 f.) distinguish between the object of appearance, the composite of form and matter plus its accidents, and the composite of form and matter alone. They contend that the composite that Aristotle considers as a candidate for primary substancehood in the Met. is not the particular substance of the Cat.,which they take to be the object in appearance in possession of its accidents, but instead what they regard as the composite of matter and form alone, without the addition of accidental properties.
Substantial change and the emergence of hylomorphism are considered more carefully in Chapter 7, Section 1.
Usually the examples of ?ME ri are concrete particulars, but they are not always obviously so; form too is described as zóSe ri, e.g., at 1017b25 and 1049’35. See n. 4 of Chapter 2 for a brief account of the discussion of the meaning of zóSe V. More will be said about zóöe zt below.
For other passages in which Aristotle maintains or implies that form is predicated of matter, see: Phys. 190x31—b5, Met. 1043x5 f., 995b35, 999a33 f., DA 412’17–19. See the convincing argument of Kung (1978) for the predicative nature of form. See also n. 2 of Chapter 2.
The same may be said of the matter of a particular composite, such as a human being, since its matter is its own complex of form and matter.
Also, in the Cat. Aristotle holds that there is no `predicate’ from primary substances, of which `Socrates’ would be an example, because such substances are not predicated of any subject (3x36 f.).
For more on the idea of `prime matter’, see n. 33 of this chapter and n. 7 of Chapter 5.
Ií is perhaps unlikely that Aristotle means for the composite to be what is predicated of matter, since, as was just noted, at Met. 1018a3 f. `Socrates’ is said to be only predicated of itself. See Frede and Patzig (1988, ii. 48), who insist that it is obvious that `substance’ in this passage from Z.3 must mean `form’, since the composite could never be the predicate of something else. Yet there is room for doubt. It is possible that Aristotle is here thinking of `substance’ in the sense of `kind’, the `secondary substance’ of the Cat.,which is found in the category of substance. In his contrast between `substance’ and items `other than substance’, Aristotle might have been thinking of substantial kinds and the other sorts of non-substantial predicates. The substantial kinds he may have regarded at times as predicates of matter, and as the subjects of the predicates `other than substance’. In the opening chapter of Zeta Aristotle even seems to be thinking of substance in the sense of `kind’, when in his characterization of `being’ in the primary sense he says that it is the `what’ of something, and he gives for his examples the kinds, `man’ and `god’ (1028a13–18). It is substances of this sort, `man’ and `god’, from which the non-substantial entities, quantities, qualities, and the like, gain their existence, through their being quantities of or qualities of these substances 018–20). Or we might consider `predications’ of this sort: `The bronze is a statue’ (cf. Irwin (1988: 214, n. 36)). Aristotle might consider this to be a case in which substance is predicated of matter; and in this circumstance it would be plausible for him to say that the non-substantial predicates (i.e., the predicates other than kinds) are predicated of `statue’, whereas `statue’ is predicated of `bronze’.
Frede (1985) and Frede and Patzig (1988, i. 36–41 and ii. 33,37–39,41–45,47 f., 243). For the case for Frede’s attributivism, see Appendix.
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Granger, H. (1996). The Case for Substantialism. In: Aristotle’s Idea of the Soul. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0785-5_4
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