Abstract
In 1931 Walter Sellar and Robert Yeatman published a delightfully silly history of England entitled 1066 and All That 2, as they said, “comprising, all the parts you can remember including one hundred and three good things, five bad kings, and two genuine dates”.3 History, they tell us, is not what you think; it is what you can remember. So their history is simplified and garbled, and the moral point is put front and center: every development is described as a good thing or a bad thing, a good king or a bad king. What makes 1066... comic is the cleverness of its insight into what confusions people actually have and the antic candor in giving us the moral point without wasting any time on dates, motivations, or any other such confusing historical details.
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Notes
Research for this paper was supported both by Arizona State University and the National Science Foundation (NSF Grant !1: SBR-9515398). This support is gratefully acknowledged.
Walter Carruthers Sellar and Robert Julian Yeatman, 1066 and All That published together in one volume with And Now All This. New York: Blue Ribbon Books, n.d.
Ibid., p.v.
See especially: J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, Michael Friedman, “Epistemology in the Aujbau”, in Synthese, 93, 1992, pp. 15–57, Michael Friedman, “Geometry, Convention, and the Relativized A Priori”, in Wesley Salmon/Gereon Wolters (Eds.), Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press and Konstanz: Universitötsverlag Konstanz 1994, and Warren Goldfarb/Thomas Ricketts, “Carnap and the Philosophy of Mathematics”, in David Bell/Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (Eds.), Science and Subjectivity. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1992, pp. 61–78.
Loc.cit.
Rudolf Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache. Wien: Springer Verlag 1934. Published in English with cuts restored as The Logical Syntax of Language. London: Routledge Kegan Paul 1937
Carl G. Hempel, “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning”, in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950, pp. 41–63.
Rudolf Carnap, letter to Neurath, December 23, 1933, Rudolf Carnap Collection, Special Collections Department, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh, [RC 029–03–06].
Rudolf Carnap, “Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik”, unpublished, Rudolf Carnap Collection, /oc. cit.,[RC 080–34–03].
Abraham Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1928.
Rudolf Carnap, “Autobiography”, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1963, p. 30.
Alfred Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 152–278.
Ibid., p. 277.
See Rudolf Carnap diary, Rudolf Carnap Collection, loc.cit.,[RC 023–73–04].
Stephen C. Kleene, “Introductory Note to 1930b, 1931 and 1932b”, in Solomon Feferman et al. (Eds.), Kurt Gödel: Collected Works, Vol.1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 126.
Rudolf Carnap diary, Rudolf Carnap Collection, /oc. cit.,[RC 023–73–04]. Quoted by permission of University of Pittsburgh Libraries.
See Rudolf Carnap diary, Rudolf Carnap Collection, loc.cit.,[RC 025–73–05]
See Rudolf Carnap, “Autobiography”, loc.cit.,p. 53 and also Rudolf Carnap diary, Rudolf Carnap Collection, loc.cit.,[RC 025–73–05]
Rudolf Carnap, “öber Protokollsötze”, in Erkenntnis,3, 2/3, 1932, pp. 215–28.
Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts, op.cit.
See especially Warren Goldfarb, “Introductory Note to *1953/9”, in: Solomon Feferman, et al. (Eds.), Kurt Gödel: Collected Works, Vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press 1995, pp.32434, and Kurt Gödel, “Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?”, in: Solomon Feferman, et al. (Eds.), loc. cit., pp.334–62.
See Alberto Coffa, op.cit.,p. 290.
Alfred Tarski, op.cit.,pp. 268–78.
The definition of translation would be still closer to those inferential practices, and hence to an answer to Quine’s demand for behavioral criteria, if he had demanded that translation preserve not only the consequence relation but also the direct consequence relation. Such an additional demand would be fully in keeping with Catnap’s approach in Logical Syntax. Moreover, it is a close analog of Catnap’s move in Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1947) from a broad notion of synonymy which is mutual logical implication to a narrower notion of intensional isomorphism.
Rudolf Carnap, Logical Syntax, loc.cit.,p.216.
Alberto Coffa, op.cit.,p.304.
Thomas Ricketts, “Camp: From Logical Syntax to Semantics”, in Ronald Giere/Alan Richardson (Eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1996, pp. 231–50.
Ibid., p.239.
Richard Creath, “Languages Without Logic”, in Origins of Logical Empiricism, loc.cit.,pp. 251265.
It might be thought that the situation could be saved by noting that Carnap’s way of designating particular expressions does not use examples and quotation marks but rather a Gödel numbering system. But even without designators for particular expressions on the object language, if we can say determinately in the metalanguage: `Some sentences (of the object language) are analytic.’ we can equally determinately say: `Somes sentences (of object language) are true.’. At the very least, this means that `true’ is as much a logical, that is, syntactical, expression as `analytic’ is. The exact difficulty in this case is closely connected to those discussed in my “Languages Without Logic”, loc.cit. I am indebted to both Thomas Ricketts and Warren Goldfarb for further discussion on this issue.
Richard Creath, “Introduction”, in Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correcpondence and Related Work. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1990, p. 31.
Rudolf Carnap, “Autobiography”, loc.cit., p. 60.
It is not a consequence, direct or otherwise, of these reflections that analyticity is essentially a syntactic notion.
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Creath, R. (1999). Carnap’s Move to Semantics: Gains and Losses. In: Woleński, J., Köhler, E. (eds) Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1998], vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0689-6_6
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