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The Ontology of the Contingent Existent

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A Paradigm Theory of Existence

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 89))

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Abstract

So far we have been treading the via negativa, and it seems to have led us to an impasse. An impressive array of arguments has been marshaled in support of the following aporetic tetrad:

  1. a.

    Existence is not a property or property-instance of individuals.

  2. b.

    Existence is not identical to individuals.

  3. c.

    Existence is not a property of properties or cognate items.

  4. d.

    Existence is not a property of worlds or domains.

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Notes

  1. Vide Chapter 4, section 8 supra.

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  2. See his Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), p. 114.

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  3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 197; 1051b5. I am not suggesting that Aristotle holds to an ontology of facts.

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  4. Cf. Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, “Truth-Makers,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLIV, no. 3 (March 1984), p. 301.

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  5. Vide Chapter 2, section 1 supra.

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  6. Cf. Greg Restall, “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 74, no. 2 (June 1996), p. 337.

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  7. Julian Dodd, An Identity Theory of Truth (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), pp. 1–18.

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  8. David Lewis, “Critical Notice of Armstrong, D. M., A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70, no. 2 (June 1992), p. 215.

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  9. D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), P. 7.

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  10. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 76–77.

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  11. Cf. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), p. 62.

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  12. Cf. James Van Cleve, “Predication without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. LIV, no. 3 (September 1994), p. 580.

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  13. A somewhat similar complaint was lodged by Aristotle against Plato in Book Alpha, Chapter 9 of the Metaphysics. See in particular 991a10.

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  14. In Roderick M. Chisholm, ed. R. Bogdan (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), p. 131.

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  15. Cf. J. P. Moreland, “Issues and Options in Exemplification,” American Philosophical Quarterly vol. 33, no. 2 (April 1996), p. 140.

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  16. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 94–95.

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  17. Alvin Plantinga, “Guise Theory” in Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), p. 44.

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  18. Cf. D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 94–96.

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  19. To be precise, it is more than a cluster of universals if a cluster of universals is itself a universal. See my article, “Bundles and Indiscernibility: A Reply to O’Leary-Hawthorne,” Analysis, vol. 57, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 91–94.

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  20. G. W. F. Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), pp. 7989.

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  21. Cf. D. M. Armstrong, Universals, op. cit., p. 38 et passim.

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  22. More generally, nothing can exist without having properties. We do not wish to rule out the possibility of a being which has its properties, not by instantiating them, but by being identical to them. Such a being is what it has.

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  23. Vide Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.6, 1031b18.

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  24. Wilfrid Sellars, “Particulars,” reprinted in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1971), p. 286.

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  25. Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Bergmann’s Constituent Ontology” Nous vol. IV, no. 2 (May 1970), p. 116.

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  26. Reinhardt Grossmann, The Categorial Structure of the World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 403.

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Authors
  1. William F. Vallicella
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Vallicella, W.F. (2002). The Ontology of the Contingent Existent. In: A Paradigm Theory of Existence. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 89. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0588-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0588-2_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6128-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0588-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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