Abstract
Whereas the stream of Aristotelianism flows in a more or less constant and continuous flux through the history of philosophical thought, Platonism seems to be comparable rather to an undulating movement with irregular ups and downs. One of its highest peaks is of course reached in Neo-Platonism. Closer in time to Hobbes, we have the forceful development of Renaissance Platonism, starting from Marsilio Ficino’s Florentine revival of the Academy, and producing thinkers such as Pico, Bruno or Campanella. Afterwards, and still during Hobbes’ own lifetime, the torch was taken over by the Cambridge Platonists under the lead of Henry More and Ralph Cudworth. Both in his own generation and in the one or two that preceded him, Hobbes thus had ample opportunity to get confronted with Platonist doctrine. To be sure, his education at Magdalen Hall in Oxford was, according to his own testimony, exclusively a matter of Aristotelian school philosophy (OL I, LXXXVI f.).1 Yet the very fact that he soon became dissatisfied with what he had learned there, could have opened his mind for alternative bodies of doctrine, among which doubtlessly Plato’s philosophy must be reckoned.
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References
References to Hobbes’ works are given in brackets in the text, ol designating the Opera Latina, and ew the English Works in the Molesworth edition. References to Plato’s works, too, are given in the text.
To Plato, ideas are immobile external entities grasped by the mind; to Hobbes, they are internal motions caused by external stimuli.
To Hobbes’ “full and pregnant” corresponds “pregnant” in Plato (2o6c–d), to Hobbes’ “wisdom, or other virtue” corresponds Plato’s “prudence and the other virtue” (2o9a), Hobbes’ “engender and produce” derives directly from Plato’s “Love is engendering and begetting” (2o6e). Hobbes’ “Socrates wise and continent” echoes Plato’s “Socrates is full of wisdom and temperance” (216d), and Hobbes’ “is notsoughtthehonour” is an echo of“Socrates is not attractedby anysort ofhonor” (216e). The theme of wisdom and knowledge is treated in Plato in the context of the favorite’s relation to the lover (184c–e), where in Hobbes it is the lover’s relation to the favorite that is central.
Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, ed. by Ferdinand Tönnies, London, 1984, p. ix.
Op. cit., p. 44.
On the printings and revisions which Ficino’s translation went through, see James Hankins, Remarks on Ficino’s Translation ofPlato, in Gian Carlo Garfagnini (ed.), Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone i, Firenze, 1986, 288. However, in view ofthe fact that Hobbes’ reference to the Symposium contains information not contained in Plato’s text (Socrates is said to have sought “issue of his
Hobbes there says that the natural affection of parents to their children is in Greek called moQyr (this is, however, only one of the meanings of this very rare Greek term).
Neque de visione aliter censuere Plato et Aristoteles quam ut esset motus, ut manifestum est… ex libro Platonis qui inscribitur Theaetetus.” Tractatus Opticus, ed. by Franco Alessio, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 18 (1963), p. 207.
Theaetetus 156a–e. See David Bostock, Plato’s Theaetetus, Oxford 1988, p. 62ff.
On this point I agree with Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy ofHobbes. Its Basis and Its Genesis, The University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 141, who says that “this judgement appears at first sight to be a caricature of the actual position”. Yet I differ from him as regards the explanation of Hobbes’ error.
One may safely assume that Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon are the ones Hobbes primarily had in mind. See Arrigo Pacchi, “Ruggero Bacone e Roberto Grossatesta in un inedito hobbesiano del 1634”, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 20 (1965), pp. 499–5o2. Hobbes was apparently impressed by their interest in “experimental” science.
Tractatus opticus, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 18 (1963), p. 148.
Recte ergo distinxit Plato duo genera rerum, quorum alterum, nempe (τb 6ν) dicebat esse, sed non fieri, alterum (τb εiναι) non esse sed fieri” (Anti-White, ed. Jacquot Jones, p. 314).
Hobbes’ statement may be vaguely comparable to passages such as Parm.154a–c (beings become what they are, but one being cannot become younger than another) or Soph. 250c (being will according to its own nature neither rest nor move). Yet it is clear that it is not these texts that Hobbes here alludes to.
I would like to thank my friend Jaap Mansfeld, to whose erudition I owe both the conjecture elucidating Hobbes’ otherwise enigmatic remark and the reference to the relevant passage in the Timaeus.
Tim. 27d. A detailed comparison shows the correctness of the above-mentioned conjecture. To Plato’s ëστιν […] διαιρετioν there corresponds Hobbes’ distinxit, Plato’s τb 6ν is quoted literally by Hobbes, the Greek γiνεσιν δi ovκ Noν is rendered by non fieri, and Plato’s γιγνdµενoν µiν ~ε~, 6ν δi ovδiπoτε becomes non esse sed fieri in Hobbes. This close correspondence shows that this is indeed the passage Hobbes had in mind.
There are two more references to Plato in Hobbes which are, however, irrelevant for our present purpose, since they go back to secondary or even tertiary sources. In De Ratiocinatione et principiis geometrarum (1666) Hobbes quotes Plato’s definition of a straight line from the then famous work on Euclid by the Jesuit Christophorus Clavius: “recta est, cujus intermedia puncta obumbrant extrema” (ol iv, 395). This definition (which goes back to Parm. 137e) had been highlighted by Proclus in his commentary on Euclid’s Book i (Friedlein log, 21f.). And in his Principia et Problemata aliquot of 1672 Hobbes mentions an unidentifiable Greek epigram, according to which Plato had “demonstrated” the five regular bodies. Hobbes correctly adds: “Plato’s demonstration is non-existent” (ol v, 2o2). In fact, Plato had never given any such demonstration.
There are several other passages in Hobbes confirming this estimate of Plato as a true and searching philosopher. In these places, however, Plato’s name is simply included in a list of important ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, Zeno, and Epicurus (ew vi, 98; ol v, 360). Elsewhere he is mentioned together with them as the founder of a special philosophical school or “heresy” (ew iii, 666f.; ew iv, 387f.; ol iii, 491 and 540) or among those Greeks who went to Egypt “to fetch philosophy into Greece” (ew vii, 74). However, none of these passages contributes in any significant sense to the overall picture sketched above (this also applies to ew iv, 426f.).
Martin Bertman, “Hobbes’ Science of Politics and Plato’s Laws”, The Independent Journal of Philosophy 2 (1978), p. 52, affirms that “Plato and Hobbes agree in a multitude of particulars, great and small”. Yet the only evidence he produces concerns Hobbes’s doctrine of the natural war of all against all which, according to him, “is stated almost at the very beginning of the Laws. The Cretan, Kleinias, when presenting the aim of Cretan institutions says,‘… all men are always at war with one another.’” (ibid., p. 49). Yet, to begin with, this is not a literal quote. Moreover, Kleinias deals with the relation between states, where Hobbes refers to individuals in the state of nature.
Is there a Ficinian reminiscence behind this? In his epitome of Book Iy of the Republic Ficino says that in a good state there need not be given new laws every day. “Therefore Plato did not pay attention to the laws (Plato nullum circa leges adhibuit studium) in this republic, since it is the best one” (Marsilio Ficino, Opera Omnia, vol. II, Torino, 1962, p. 1402).
In what follows I will not discuss minor coincidences unrelated to political thought, such as the incidental use of the Greek proverb “what is beautiful, is difficult” in both authors (Rep. 435c, 497d; ol iv, 85; see my “Methodenfragen bei Spinoza und Hobbes”, Studia Spinozana 3 [1987], p. 57f.);* their image that the spark of truth springs “as out of flint” (Rep. 435a) or is contained “as in a flint” (ol v, 92); or Plato’s passing reference to “geometrical necessity” (Rep. 458d)–a theme dear to Hobbes.
However, one should not allow oneself to be fooled by such analogies. On the one hand, the idea involved is widespread in Western thought (see, e.g., George Perrigo Conger, Theories of Macrocosms and Microcosms in the History of Philosophy, New York, 19673). On the other hand, it has been shown that Hobbes’ Leviathan metaphor derives from some seventeenth century dictionaries (see Samuel Mintz, “Leviathan as Metaphor”, Hobbes Studies 2 [ 1989 ], pp. 3–9 ).
I think that Simone Goyard-Fabre, Le droit et la loi dans la philosophie de Thomas Hobbes, Paris, 1975, p. 175, n. 249 is right in her suggestion that on this point Plato could have provided the “model” Hobbes elaborates. Yet this elaboration takes a turn that is completely different from Plato.
Hobbes continues: “even to one another’s body”. This addition already shows the difference between his conception of the community of goods (in the state of nature) and that of Plato (which occurs only in the state, where it is restricted to the state’s guardians). For in Plato’s state “nobody has anything proper to him, except his own body” (Rep. 464d).
As S. Goyard-Fabre remarks, “all the partisans of the covenant are the more or less direct heirs of the sophists’ artificialism” (Le droit et la loi, p. 85, n. 1). Yet she makes it clear that this does not entail any dependence of Hobbes on Greek sophists.
Revised version of“Hobbes and Aristotle’s Politics”, in: Gianfranco Borrelli (ed.), Thomas Hobbes. Le ragioni del moderno tra teologia e politica, Napoli: Morano 199o, pp. 97–127.
References to the Politics will be given between brackets in the text, indicating only the book and chapter of the work. Translations (including those from Hobbes) are my own. The books of the Politics will be counted according to their traditional order.
Also Hobbes’ enumeration of the characteristics of supreme power at ol ii, 232 reminds one of the three elements of constitutions dealt with in iv, 14–16.
Here, however, Hobbes differs from Aristotle in that, according to him, men cannot be said to be bad by nature, but only to have certain passions (ol ii, 147). Aristotle, in contrast, insists on the wickedness of most people.
In the opening part of his Politics Aristotle inserts the village between the family and the state as an intermediary form of society (i, 2). This feature is absent in Hobbes. However, it should be noted that as a matter of fact the village plays no prominent role in Aristotle’s later considerations.
Hobbes time and again (aw iv, 120, 245; oL ii, 211f.; aw iii,156) contests Aristotle’s affirmation that “man is more of apolitical animal thanbees are” (i, 2). Yet the fact that Hobbes in most places does not mention simply bees, but speaks of “bees and ants etc.”, shows that in most cases it is not Pol.i, 2 he has in mind, but rather Hist. an. i, 1, where Aristotle enumerates among political animals “man, bee, wasp, ant, and crane”. Hist. an. i,1 is referred to in aw iv, 245, too.
The parallel in De Cive says: “Scio Aristotelem, libro primo Politicorum, tanquam fundamentum totius scientiae politicae affirmare, hominum alios a natura factos esse dignos, qui imperent, alios qui serviant” (ol ii, 189). The Leviathan repeats: “I know that Aristotle in the first book of his Politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort…; others to Serve (meaning those that had strong bodies)” (ew iii, 140; cf. ol iii, 118: “Scio Aristotelem [Lib. i. Politicorum] quasi principio uti, esse alios a natura factos ad imperium…, alios ad serviendum.”).
Italicization–which in Hobbes marks a quotation–according to the Tönnies edition of The Elements ofLaw. The Molesworth edition which is based on the “inferior” original edition of 1650, italicizes only the words “despotical” and “freemen”.
The full text reads: “Aristoteles Politicorum lib. 7. cap. 14. duo esse ait genera regiminum, quorum alterum ad imperantis, alterum ad subditorum commodum dirigitur” (ol ii, 265 ). The continuation about despotical government and government of free men is missing here. A conspicuous feature is the absence of any indication that here a direct quote is given. This and the italicization of imperantis and subditorum is in remarkable harmony with the same text in the seemingly inferior edition of the Elements of Law as published in 1650. I cannot offer a plausible explanation of this fact.
The exact wording is: “Magnos tamen habet error hic fautores, Aristotelem et alios”. This is the only place where Aristotle is explicitly mentioned in connection with the tenet of the sovereign’s subjection to civil law. The parallel places, such as Ew iv, 205, Ew iii, 312 and oL iii, 233 f., simply speak of an “opinion” or “doctrine” without identifying those who held it. In oL ii, 288 Hobbes goes on to say that Aristotle and others had come to their view “propter impotentiam humanam”, i.e. because of man’s lack of restraint which makes him tend towards despotism. This argument goes back in last instance to Politics iii, 15 and 16.
This fact was noticed already by Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy ofHobbes, Chicago, 1961, p. 63 (“In the Elements, Aristotle’s assertion that the object of democracy is freedom meets with more justice at Hobbes’s hands […] than it does later”), by John Laird, “Hobbes on Aristotle’s Politics”, Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, New Series vol. 43, London, 1943, p. 18 (“Hobbes’s comment on the same passage in his De Cive turned praise into censure”), and by David P. Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan. The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, Oxford, 1979, p. 145 f. (“a marked change of opinion”; in interpreting it, however, Gauthier is fooled by his blindly relying upon the English version of the Rudiments).
Atque hoc est quod voluit Aristoteles, ipse quoque consuetudine temporis libertatem pro imperio nominans, Lib. 6. Politicorum, cap. 2. In statu populari libertas est ex suppositione. Quod vulgo dicunt, tanquam extra statum hunc liber esset nemo.”
Hobbes once more alludes to this word in ew iii, 682, where he says that “from Aristotle’s Civil Philosophy” men have learned “to call the condition of the people under the Democracy, Liberty”.
Quoniam ergo Athenienses, ne statum mutare cuperent, liberos solos esse eos qui in civitate viverent populari, servosque esse qui sub monarcha essent, docebantur; ideo Aristoteles (in Polit. Lib vi, cap. 2) libertatem supponi in democratia scripsit, neminemque in alia civitatis forma esse liberum” (ol iii, 163).
Nor are the “quotes” from vi, 2 which occur in different versions in the Elements of Law, in De Cive and in Leviathan, taken directly from any current sixteenth-century Latin translation of the Politics (they do not harmonize with the Greek text either). This is shown by information I owe to Dr. Ulrich Dierse (Bochum), who kindly checked for me, with negative result, a dozen of such translations available at the famous Herzog August library in Wolfenbüttel.
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Schuhmann, K., Steenbakkers, P., Leijenhorst, C. (2004). Hobbes and the Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. In: Steenbakkers, P., Leijenhorst, C. (eds) Selected papers on Renaissance philosophy and on Thomas Hobbes. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0485-4_10
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