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Situated Knowledge and the Interplay of Value Judgments and Evidence in Scientific Inquiry

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In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 316))

Abstract

Feminist philosophy of science is committed to the view that science neither is, nor ought to be, neutral among social and political values. Scientific theories, recognized as legitimate contributions by the scientific community, often embody androcentric or sexist values, and hence are subject to criticism by feminists. Feminists also seek to advance feminist scientific research programs that are explicitly informed by feminist values.

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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Anderson, E. (2002). Situated Knowledge and the Interplay of Value Judgments and Evidence in Scientific Inquiry. In: Gärdenfors, P., Woleński, J., Kijania-Placek, K. (eds) In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library, vol 316. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0475-5_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0475-5_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6145-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0475-5

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