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Proof Theory and Meaning

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Handbook of Philosophical Logic ((HALO,volume 9))

Abstract

The meaning of a sentence determines how the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence may be proved and hence one would expect proof theory to be influenced by meaning-theoretical considerations. In the present chapter we consider a proposal that also reverses the above prior-ities and determines meaning in terms of proof. The proposal originates in the criticism that Michael Dummett has voiced against a realist, truth-theoretical, conception of meaning and has been developed largely by him and Dag Prawitz, whose normalisation procedures in technical proof theory constitute the main technical basis of the proposal.

Dedicated to Stig Kanger on the occasion of his 60th birthday

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    1. Göran Sundholm
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    1. King’ College, London, UK

      D. M. Gabbay

    2. Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München, Germany

      F. Guenthner

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    Sundholm, G. (2002). Proof Theory and Meaning. In: Gabbay, D.M., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0464-9_3

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0464-9_3

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