Abstract
The topic of the present section E is how one decides which type of proposition one is confronted with in the individual instance: definition or characterisation? normative or descriptive proposition?
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Section A 6 (2) above. — An exception applies in the case of the concept of ‘fused descriptive and normative proposition’, see item (2) below, concluding remarks.
See sections A 2 (1) concluding remarks and B 3.3.2 (2), both above, on the broad use of the word “proposition” in this work.
See in particular sections B 3.3.6 and 5.4.2 (2), above.
See for example The International Classification of Diseases, from the World Health Organisation (10th ed. 1992).
I refer to what has been said earlier about the arbitrariness and incoherence of laying down determinacy in the delimitation as a necessary criterion in concepts of ‘concept’ or ‘definition’ (section B 4.1 (3)(b), see also section B 2.2, above). — Especially concerning factor structure of concept criteria I refer to my discussions of family resemblance (sections B 3.2.2 and 6.2 (2), above) and my discussions of evaluation prescriptions in the connotations of concepts (sections B 6.1 and 6.2 (1), above).
Huser, Avtaletolking [interpretation of contracts], pp. 67–68, 73–78.
Eckhoff, Rettskildelcere [doctrine of the sources of law], pp. 123–25; Augdahl, Rettskilder [sources of law], pp. 83–88; von Eyben, Juridisk grundbog, Bind 1: Retskilderne [basic manual of law, vol. 1: the sources of law], pp. 27, 28; Cross, Statutory Interpretation, pp. 21 et seq.; Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 316–20, 328 et seq.
On the psychological aspect, and as part of this, the present work’s discussion and decision perspective on linguistic meaning, see further in section 2.2.5 below.
On the concept of ‘definiteness of intention’, see section 2.2.5 (2) below. Here it is sufficient to understand “definiteness of intention” in the spatio-analogical sense of ‘the breadth and depth of what one has thought over’.
Boe, ‘Utvikling i lovers form og innhold’ [development in the form and content of statutes], pp. 662 et seq.; ‘Fusadommen i forvaltningsrettslig og rettsteoretisk perspektiv’ [the Fusa judgment in the perspectives of administrative law and legal theory], pp. 326–29; ‘Domstolskontroll med forvaltningen’ [judicial review of public administration], pp. 329 et seq.; Eckhoff, Rettkildeltere [doctrine of the sources of law], pp. 80–84; Fleischer, Rettskilder [sources of law], pp. 105–07; Graver, Materiell forvaltningsrett [substantive administrative law], pp. 70 et seq.; Kjonstad, Rett til helsehjelp og sosiale tjenester [the right to health care and social services], pp. 85–86; Innfgring i trygderett [introduction to social security law], pp. 195–96.
This was the rule according to both the Criminal Procedure Act 1887 (Act No. 5 of 1 July) and the Criminal Procedure Act 1981 (Act No. 25 of 22 May). See further next note.
Cf. Act No. 80 of 11 June 1993 concerning amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act, which introduced a system of two instances (in operation from 1 August 1995).
Weber, ‘Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie’, p. 440, pp. 441–74 passim; Ho-mans, The Human Group, pp. 122–24; Galtung, ‘Expectations and Interaction Processes’, pp. 214–17; Aubert, Sosiologi [sociology] (1964), Chapter 2, in particular pp. 24–33; Sosiologi (1979), p. 85; Rettens sosiale funksjon [the social function of law], p. 18; Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 42 et seq., 54; Soziale Systeme, pp. 436 et seq.; Das Recht der Gesellschaft, pp. 133–34.
Galtung, ‘Expectations and Interaction Processes’, pp. 216–17; Aubert/ Messinger, ‘The Criminal and the Sick’, pp. 146–47; Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, p. 42; Soziale Systeme, p. 437; Das Recht der Gesellschaft, pp. 133–34. — A more complex model is provided by Rommetveit, Social Norms and Roles, pp. 44–52 (more complex inter alia because Rommetveit seems to lay down cognitive expectations (much of what Rommetveit calls “expectations”) as a criterion of normative expectations (much of what Rommetveit calls “pressure”)).
On purely linguistic criteria of the concept of ‘norm’, see section A 6 (3) above.
Compare Nxss, Interpretation and Preciseness, pp. 271–72; Anscombe, Intention, pp. 56–57; Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power, p. 38; Searle, ‘A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts’, pp. 3–4; Eckhoff/ Sundby, Rettssystemer [legal systems] p. 51; Rechtssysteme,p. 47. — Eckhoff/ Sundby do not distinguish between expectations and propositions, in that those places in Galtung and Luhmann that are mentioned in item (i) above, are said to use the reaction criterion to distinguish between propositions.
Sundby, Om normer [on norms], Part 1.
Op. cit., Chapter 5.
Op. cit., pp. 27–28.
See Eckhoff/ Sundby, Rettssystemer [legal systems], 1st ed., Chapter 6 (pp. 108–17 et passim) on internalisation, and pp. 52–53 on interpretation; 2nd ed., pp. 52–56 on internalisation, and pp. 51–52 on interpretation; Rechtssysteme,pp. 48–51 on internalisation, and pp. 47–48 on interpretation.
Compare Hart, The Concept of Law, 1st ed. pp. 54–56,86–88,112–14; 2nd ed. pp. 55–57, 88–91, 115–17; MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, pp. 139–40, 275–92. — Differently in e.g. Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, pp. 42–43; Sundby, Om normer [on norms], pp. 139–41. In the places mentioned both place greater weight on the abstract differences: on the fact that they themselves take their points of departure in respectively expectations in contradistinction to propositions, and propositions in contradistinction to expectations (for Luhmann it is also important that his definition is “funktional”, see pp. 42, 60–61 including note 68, but this aspect is not relevant here).
Compare Stigen, Betydning og mening, handling og ytring [signification and meaning, action and utterance] pp. 73 et seq. (“what is primary, signification or meaning” (p. 73); “ ‘meaning’ is a more fundamental concept than ‘signification’ ” (p. 74)).
See section I 6 above; cf. sections A 6 (2) and B 4.1 (5)(c) above, and G 2 (4)(c) below.
See section III 2.2.2 (3)(c) below on such theories.
See in particular Næss, Interpretation and Preciseness, Foreword and Introduction, both with further references.
Næss, En del elementcere logiske emner [some elementary topics in logic], pp. 31–32. Compare same writer, Interpretation and Preciseness, p. 79: A question of meaning lies outside a person’s definiteness of intention when “[t]he fundamentum divisionis was unknown and not even indirectly contemplated or applied by him”; Hvilken verden er den virkelige? [which world is the real one?], pp. 145–46: “[The concept of] ‘definiteness of intention’… has been adapted to empirical investigative methodology (psychological and phenomenological concepts of ‘intention’).” - The concept of ‘definiteness of intention’ was introduced in Interpretation and Preciseness, see particularly pp. 7980. See also Nays, Scepticism, pp. 102–04; The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise, p. 129. For Næss’ more precise definition, see particularly the three places last mentioned.
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Eng, S. (2003). Separating. In: Analysis of Dis/Agreement — with particular reference to Law and Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0381-9_6
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