Abstract
The twelve original studies collected in this volume examine different aspects of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations. They are authored by scholars and specialists internationally recognized for their expertise in the fields of phenomenology, logic, history of philosophy and philosophy of mind. They approach Husserl’s groundwork from different angles and perspectives and shed new light on a number of issues such as meaning, intentionality, ontology, logic, etc. They also explore questions such as the place of the Logical Investigations within the whole of Husserl’s work, its sources in 19th century philosophy and in particular in the philosophical work of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, its reception amongst the so called members of the Munich Circle and its influence on contemporary philosophy. In short, this volume constitutes a “companion” to Husserl’s Logical Investigations.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
In his Preface to the new edition of J. N. Findlay 1970 translation of the Logical Investigations,Michael Dummett emphasizes this point: “Any analytical philosopher interested in how philosophy arrived at its present state thus needs to study the Logical Investigations to discover how the philosophical traditions that stemmed from the work of these two innovators came to diverge so widely”.(p. xvii).
Despite Hussserl’s criticism of this characterisation (i.e. the identification of phenomenology with psychology) which was meant first of all to avoid the confusion with scientific psychology, descriptive psychology continues to play an important role in Husserl’s phenomenology. This discipline took different names over the years such as intentional psychology, eidetical psychology or phenomenological psychology, but in the 1920s, namely in the 1925 lectures on phenomenological psychology, its function is so central that one could see in this discipline the “royal path” to Husserl’s transcendental philosophy.
As we know, the expression “descriptive psychology” or “psychognosie” is taken over from Brentano’s lectures held from 1887 to 1891 under the title “Deskriptive Psychologie”, “Psychognosie” and “Beschreibende Phänomenologie”. These lectures have been edited by R. M. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner under the title Deskriptive Psychologie, Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1982.
The Archives in Munich have numerous manuscripts of Daubert written in shorthand that K. Schuhmann, in 1976, managed to decipher. On Daubert’s phenomenology and his criticism of the idealistic turn, see Schuhmann (1989) and Schuhmann/Smith (1985).
Much more important for the history of phenomenology is the meeting which took place in 1905 in Seefeld. In his correspondence with Daubert, Husserl gives a good idea of one of the important subjects of discussion in Seefeld: “Ich mühe mich, über das Ideengebiet der Logischen Untersuchungen hinauszukommen.” (BW II, p. 41). On the various meetings of the Munich Circle of Munich, see Schuhmann (1973).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fisette, D. (2003). Introduction. In: Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsidered. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 48. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0207-2_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0207-2_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6324-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-0207-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive