Abstract
When we undertake an analysis of the concept of action, we can immediately come up with a number of assertions which seem plausible enough to serve as a starting point for a theory of action. As long as we look at them one at a time, they appear to be intuitive theses that can easily be inferred from an analysis of ordinary language. Thus, they seem to express more or less firmly established truths. Unfortunately, however, these theses confront us with a great inconvenience: they are not easily compatible with each other.
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References
Some of them have been formulated in Searle 1984, ch. 4.
Cf. Nino 1987, p. 23.
Cf. Hampshire/Hart 1958, p. 8.
Hart 1949; for a summary of this theory, cf. below Chapter III, sect. 3.
Moore 1993, pp. 9, 61–65.
However, the problems are not identical, because one could hold that actions are ‘natural classes’ and still deny that they are bodily movements (for example, some authors prefer to identify them with mental states, such as ‘volitions’).
Cf. Moore 1993, p. 90.
Feinberg 1968, p. 106.
Nino 1972, p. 43.
Cf. Moore 1993, p. 237.
Cf. Bernstein 1971, ch. 4.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Lagier, D.G. (2003). Our Intuitions and the Paradoxes of Action. In: The Paradoxes of Action. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0205-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0205-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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