The World Well Won: Husserl’s Epistemic Realism One Hundred Years Later

  • Dallas Willard
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 164)


By “epistemic realism” I understand the view that the objects of veridical thought and perception both exist and have the characteristics they are therein discovered to have without regard to whether or not they are in any way actually present to any mind of any type.


Logical Investigation Continue Existence Pure Logic Metaphysical Doctrine Epistemic Realism 
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  1. 1.
    E. HUSSERL, The Idea of Phenomenology,trans. L. Hardy, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, 20‒21. All page references to the Logical Investigations are to the English translation: E. HUSSERL, Logical Investigations,trans. J. N. Findlay, New York: Humanities Press, 1970, abbreviated as LI.Google Scholar
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    For further discussion of what it is to be, and how it applies to the Ideal as well as the real, I refer to my Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 1984, 187–188, etc. For further discussion of many points only mentioned in this paper, see my “The Integrity of the Mental Act: Husserlian Reflections on a Fregean Problem,” in Mind, Meaning and Mathematics, ed. L. Haaparanta, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, 235–262; and my “Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, eds. B. Smith and D. W. Smith, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 138–167.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dallas Willard
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Southern CaliforniaUSA

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