Abstract
I have now completed my defense of the view that moral judgments are capable of truth and falsity, and that we can have moral knowledge. In the first chapter I argued that moral judgments are no different in principle from statements of fact in other areas of discourse. In Chapters 2 through 8 I have expounded a moral theory which I believe would be acceptable to almost everyone, philosophers and non-philosophers alike; in fact, most of what I argued in Chapter 2 and Chapter 8 could apply to any moral theory, even a non-cognitivist one. Throughout I have tried to deal with objections which have been raised against similar specific tenets in the past. While other possible theories might be equally coherent and equally able to accommodate all well established moral beliefs, I do maintain that any such theory would — as I believe mine does — incorporate the fundamental truth conditions of moral judgments.
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Notes
See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 116–117,
James Wallace, Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), Chapter 2, and
Richard Miller, Moral Differences: Truth, Justice and Conscience in a World of Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Chapter 5.
Persons, Animals, and Fetuses (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), Part IV.
A situation in which this actually happened: where one person arrested while the code team was engaged in resuscitating another is discussed by Kevin M. McIntyre, Robert C. Benfari, and M. Pabst Battin, ‘Two Cardiac Arrests, One Medical Team,’ Hastings Center Report, 12 (1982): 24 – 25.
As it happened, neither suffered cardiac arrest, and both were eventually discharged back to the penitentiary. I never heard what became of Smith, but it is probable that he died within a few months. Jones is, so far as I know, still alive and well.
An anonymous referee of this manuscript pointed out the need to emphasize this factor.
See, for example, Jeremy Bentham, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner, 1948), Chapter 13, sec. 1. He maintains that punishment, since it is itself an evil, only justifiable when it will prevent a greater evil. Adding punishment of an offender to his offense will only create a greater sum of evil, unless the punishment can do some good as well, such as deterring others from committing similar crimes. Therefore, punishing someone solely for retribution is inconsistent with the principle of utility.
See Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant: Ethical Philosophy, James W. Ellington, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 35 – 36.
See The Philosophy of Law, Part II, W. Hastie, trans. (Edinburgh: T.T. Clark, 1887), 194–198. According to Kant, punishment is solely for the restoration of equality; it ought never to be imposed on a person — or mitigated — for other ends, such as commuting a death sentence for a criminal if he will submit to medical experiments.
See Utilitarianism in the Utilitarians (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), 409.
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 30–32. Kant attempts to show that all wrong actions have in common that they are based on maxims that no one could will to be universally applied because it would be inconsistent to do so. Making a promise you do not intend to keep in order to gain something could not be consistently given universal application, but the reason for this is not that people could not do so, but that the practice would be self-defeating, and thus something one could not rationally will. And this is a consequence, although not of a specific action, but of a maxim’s being universally adopted. Kant may well not have agreed with this interpretation. But again, why are the moral law, rational nature which recognizes it, and the good will which wants to follow it good? This is a question which I don’t think Kant ever satisfactorily answers. But I think an answer is possible, although it isn’t one which Kant would like. This is that what makes it wrong to do what, if everyone tried to do would be impossible or self-defeating, is the value of human purposes. Unless purposes had value, it wouldn’t matter whether they could be defeated by one’s actions or pursued by actions which would be impossible if everyone did them. In addition, as we saw in Chapter 5, it is wrong for anyone to fail to do her share in the upkeep of valuable institutions and practices, such as promising and developing one’s capacities to make the world a better place. This is wrong partly from unfairness, but also because of the value of the institutions and practices themselves. If they didn’t have any value, there wouldn’t be anything wrong with failing to do one’s share to promote them.
See David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 217–236.
See Roderick Firth, ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12 (1952): 317 – 345.
That is, under the veil of ignorance, where we do not know what our life circumstances are. See A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 136 – 142
See also my arguments in Chapter 6. Others might simply assert that God had said that abortions are wrong and therefore that they are wrong, and would make no attempt to justify their judgments further. Of course, if they did attempt to do so, such pronouncements would need major argument — e.g., how does one know what God said (as opposed to fallible human interpreters), why should we accept God’s word as ultimate (e.g., He is the ultimate moral expert, or we will go to Hell if we don’t).
A discussion of the issue of who or what counts as a person is beyond the scope of this book. I have dealt with this issue in Persons, Animals, and Fetuses, Parts III and IV.
David Resnik has pointed out that many moral disagreements are based on differences of metaphysical and religious views. This is true, but it does not count against anything I have said here. Either such views are held because they are thought to be facts, or they are held for other reasons. If thought to be facts, they can be used to support a moral view in the same way that facts in general are. One can argue against a moral position based on such a metaphysical or religious view by citing facts to dispute that view. More commonly, religious and metaphysical positions are not treated as facts. Rather, they are positions one holds in spite of evidence and observations. Some religious persons say that they must believe, because this is all that makes life tolerable for them, or because it is the foundation of their society, or because it provides a framework for their lives. One might then dispute the religious or metaphysical position by arguing that these are not adequate reasons for belief in the truth of the view in question, and are thus unable to support the truth of a moral view.
Graber and Thomasma, Theory and Practice in Medical Ethics, Chapter 2.
See Chapter 5.
See my discussion of this point in Persons, Animals, and Fetuses.
And for this reason the staff’s feelings about the two felons — i.e., that Jones deserves nothing but what it is required to do — would be a poor guide to action.
One might argue that Jones did not actually kill the poor woman; he ought not for that reason to be chosen not to get resuscitation. He was, however, responsible for the horrible experience that made her depressed enough to end her life on hearing of his release.
I am indebted to James Forrester for pointing this out.
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© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Forrester, M.G. (2002). Solving Moral Problems. In: Moral Beliefs and Moral Theory. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9994-8_9
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