Abstract
In 1976 Thorbjörn Fälldin was elected the new Prime Minister of Sweden. When taking office he prioritized one task above all others: to stop nuclear power. In this ambition he was supported by half the Swedish people.1 In this chapter we will follow the Prime Minister’s struggle, and analyse the methods he used to realize his task. We will see that nuclear waste and new legislation became the most important tools. The discussion about nuclear power in Sweden at this time was focused on the decision to fuel the seventh reactor, Ringhals 3, of a planned programme of thirteen reactors (this number was later changed to twelve).
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Notes
Holmberg & Asp 1984: 284.
For descriptions of the election campaign, the formation of a new government and the Government’s decisions concerning nuclear power until their resignation in October 1978 see Elmbrant 1991, Hammerich 1977, Larsson 1986, Leijonhufvud 1979, Lindquist 1997, Sahr 1985, Schagerholm 1993 and Vedung 1979. Shorter and more selective stories are given in Bergstrom & Larson 1979, Holmberg & Asp 1984 and Kageson & Kjellstrom 1984. Cf. Anshelm 2000. The political decisions after the Government’s resignation in September 1978 to the final decision to fuel more reactors in March 1980 are much less well described.
In the general election in 1973 the Centre Party received 25.1% of the votes. According to opinion polls, in November 1975 the Centre Party had 23% of the votes, in January 1976 21%, in February 20% and the lowest number of 19.5% in March 1976. In April Fälldin made his first strong commitment on nuclear power. For a description of the opinion polls see Elmbrant 1991:123, 147, 150, and Holmberg & Asp 1984. At a broadcast press conference shortly before the election, on August 25, Fälldin informed the public of the Centre Party’s policy that all nuclear power plants should be shut down by the year 1985, and on September 9 that Barsebäck 2 never was to be fueled (Larsson 1986: 51–52). In the election in September 1976 the Centre Party received 24.1% of the votes. This was a bit lower than the result three years earlier but 5% higher than the polls had shown in the early spring of 1976 (Vedung 1979: 20).
Leijonhufvud 1979: 43.
SFS 1977:140.
KBS, short for Nuclear Fuel Safety, was a project group set up jointly by the Swedish nuclear power companies. In order to meet the provisions of the Stipulation Act this project produced a lot of reports concluding with a summary report (KBS 1977a), where the KBS technical concept was presented. Therefore, in the following both the KBS project, the KBS technical concept and the KBS report (-s) are referred to. In 1978 the KBS technical concept was followed by a concept for final storage of spent fuel which has not been reprocessed. This concept was called KBS 2, and hence the first concept has been called KBS 1. In 1983 the KBS 3 concept was developed, which still exists, though slightly changed over the years.
KBS 1977a.
Hammerich 1977: 103.
For detailed discussions of the Government’s early negotiations see Hammerich 1977, Larsson 1986, Leijonhufvud 1979 and Vedung 1979.
Cited from Hammerich 1977: 286.
The Barsebäck decision was not a good start for the new Prime Minister Thorbjöm Fälldin, who was accused by his political enemies and the mass media for betraying his earlier promises not to fuel more reactors. The decision stated that Sydkraft had to show contracts of reprocessing services before October 1977. No requirements for final storage were stated.
SFS 1977:140; cf. DsI 1978:28 and Johansson & Steen 1981: 35.
See Vedung 1979: 27–28.
Cited from Johansson & Steen 1981: 67–68.
DsI 1978:29, review from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, p. 32. Cf. KBS 1977a: 17.
Vedung 1979: 34.
DsI 1978:28, 29.
DsI 1978:28.
Larsson 1986: 279; Vedung 1979: 39.
DsI 1978:28, p. 3.
See Lewin 1992 and Rothstein 1992 for descriptions of the remiss process in relation to the corporative character of the Swedish state.
Johansson & Steen 1981:60, cf. p. 15.
Johansson & Steen 1981: 60.
Johansson & Steen 1981: 20.
Johansson & Steen 1981:58.
Johansson & Steen 1981: 160.
See DsI 1978:28 and DsI 1978:29.
NU 1976/77:23.
See the review from SSI in DsI 1978:29.
See SSI review p. 15 in DsI 1978:29.
DsI 1978:29, cited from the PRAY review, p. 6.
DsI 1978:29.
DsI 1978:29.
NU 1976/77:23.
There is an extensive body of work comparing risk regulation and policy cultures in different countries. For an overview see Jasanoff 1986.
Johansson & Steen 1981: 20.
Johansson & Steen 1981: 30.
See Larsson 1986: 299.
Larsson 1986: 282.
Larsson 1986: 282.
The negotiations between the three party leaders are described in Vedung 1979: ch. 3, where the written documents are also included.
Vedung 1979: 49.
The Minister of Justice, Sven Romanus, was not a member of any political party. He was a Government official by profession. The Government meeting and the interpretation of the Stipulation Act made by Romanus are described in Elmbrant 1991: 210, Larsson 1986: 314f, Leijonhufvud 1979: 135f and Vedung 1979: 53f.
Leijonhufvud 1979: 136; cf. Larsson 1986: 316 and Vedung 1979: 53–54.
Vedung 1979: 60.
A national referendum was considered as an escape route already in the Government’s declaration from 1976.
Vedung 1979: 205, Document 7; see also Johansson & Steen 1981: 8.
Vedung 1979: 59–60.
Vedung 1979: 60.
Vedung 1979: 67–68.
Vedung 1979: 72.
See the resolution written jointly by the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. See Vedung 1979: 218, Document 15; Leijonhufvud 1979: 181.
Leijonhufvud 1979: 182–183.
Swedish Government Decision, 1978–10–05.
SKI 1979a: Appendix.
See for example KBS 1977b: 68. For item 7 see the report of the advisory group, SKI 1979a: 49.
KBS 1979a: 9.
KBS 1979a.
SKI 1979a.
SKI 1979a.
SKI 1979a: 41–51.
SKI 1979a.
Sahr 1985: 101.
SKI 1979b: 33. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed description of the different geological interpretations made of the Sternö area.
Ny Teknik 1979–02–22.
See Holmberg & Asp 1984: 49f and Hedberg 1991: 9f for the reports on the TMI accident in Swedish mass media.
See Elmbrant 1989: ch. 16 for an interpretation of Palme’s thoughts and acts in relation to the TMI accident and the national referendum.
Elmbrant 1989: 228f.
Jamison 1987: 46.
Holmberg & Asp 1984: 53f.
Swedish National Parliament Statement 1979/80:10.
Elmbrant 1989: 232; Kageson & Kjellström 1984: 66.
Elmbrant 1989: 233f; K3geson & Kjellström 1984: 79.
From late 1976, when the construction work of the Ringhals 3 reactor was completed, to March 1980, when the referendum was held, another three reactors had been completed. The Government had received four different (but similar) applications and all of them were approved of shortly after the referendum.
Beck 1992; Giddens 1990.
For boundary work see Gieryn 1983, 1995, 1999.
See Anshelm (2000) for a detailed description of the public debate of nuclear power in Sweden.
SKI 1979b.
Habermas 1971.
Jasanoff 1990: 244. Cf. Chapter 2.
KBS 1977a: 143f.
Larsson 1986: 77; Leijonhufvud 1979: 149f.
Leijonhufvud 1994: 153.
See for example Larsson 1987: 159 and Brante 1984: 136–137.
I do not think that most Swedish people were aware that they put the law into practice and assessed rock formations when they voted in the referendum, but the fact is that the referendum was held in order to solve these problems. New nuclear power plants had to be approved of in accordance with the Nuclear Power Stipulation Act, which required absolutely safe storage for the spent fuel. In the referendum the people voted on whether new plants should be fueled or not, and the politicians had pledged to follow the results of the referendum. Interpreted in this way the referendum was really about whether the bedrock was safe enough.
Brante 1984: 136–137.
Holmberg & Asp 1984: 540.
Nelkin 1987: 291.
For more details about AKA see Chapter 3.
Val 76: Socialdemokratema, 1976–09–13. The organization Mr Palme referred to was the Union for Concerned Scientists. However, after the television broadcast the Union sent Palme a telegram where they clearly denied his interpretation, and stated that his comment on nuclear waste was untrue and misleading, and that the Union’s opinion was the contrary: the problem was not technically solved. No technically and economically acceptable solution had been demonstrated, and a lot more research was needed before a solution could be found to the problem of radioactive waste, the Union argued. Palme commented on the telegram and said that he had actually read in a journal that the Union claimed that the problem was solved. He also referred to a report co–authored by one of the leading members of the Union (TV–Rapport 1976–09–17).
Val 76: Centern, 1976–09–02.
Dagens Industri 1976–09–09.
SOU 1976:30, p. 83.
SOU 1976:30, p. 89.
The reviewers of the AKA report delivered their reports one month after the general election, and expressed divided opinions on the claims made in the AKA report. Many reviewers wondered, for example, about what “satisfactory possibilities” meant, and how it could be argued that satisfactory technologies existed when at the same time a lot of uncertainties, risks and lack of operational experiences and detailed plans were pointed out. See more about the review of the AKA report in Chapter 6.
Valduell Palme–Fälldin, 1976–09–01.
Val 76: Socialdemokraterna, 1976–09–13.
Val 76: Centern, 1976–09–22.
DsI 1978:29; see also Johansson & Steen 1981: 76.
DsI 1978:29.
Svenska Dagbladet 1978–04–13.
Svenska Dagbladet 1978–04–13.
Svenska Dagbladet 1978–08–22.
Brante 1984: 136.
Cf. Jasanoff’s thesis that a technical interpretation of an issue creates room for experts to make policy. See Jasanoff 1990 and Chapter 2.
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Sundqvist, G. (2002). Interpreting Absolute Safety. In: The Bedrock of Opinion. Environment & Policy, vol 32. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9950-4_5
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