Abstract
Nicolai Hartmann was educated at his birthplace Riga (Latvia) and at St. Petersburg (Russia), where he graduated from gymnasium in 1901, prior to his university studies in medicine at Tartu (German, Dorpat; Russian, Yuryev) in Estonia and in classical philology at St. Petersburg. When he changed fields to philosophy, he moved to the university at Marburg, Germany. The principal chairs in philosophy there were held by the neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. Under their direction, he worked intensively on ancient philosophy, completing his doctoral dissertation in 1907 and his Habilitationschrift on Platos Logik des Seins (Plato’s logic of being) in 1909. By 1912, however, Hartmann began a struggle against the general neo-Kantian approach and against the logical idealism of his chief academic mentors at Marburg. This shift was brought on, as he himself later reported, largely by studying the work of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler. The change did not become public, however, until his Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (Outlines of a metaphysics of cognition) appeared in 1921, after he assumed in 1920 the chair Natorp had held at Marburg. In that work he declares affinity with the work of these phenomenologists, whom he identified as his nearest philosophical neighbors. Still, he had hardly any contact with other members of the phenomenological movement until 1925, when he became a colleague of Scheler at Cologne. They remained friends until Scheler’s death in 1928. In 1931 Hartmann transferred to a chair at Berlin and finally to Göttingen in 1945. He died at Göttingen on October 9, 1950.
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Selected Bibliography
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References
Concerning this last point, there is probably little real disagreement between Hartmann and Heidegger. Both surely reject the conceit of Hegel that there might be a person (even a “great”person) possessed by a monomaniacal passion that would be a perception of an actual future occurrence. There is a genuine and very basic disagreement between the two all the same, and Hartmann surely misrepresents it when he suggests that Heidegger is naively unaware of the difference between his conception of temporality and the concept of real time which Hartmann advocates. The choices made by any moral being (any Dasein in Heidegger’s technical meaning of the term) are ways of assigning itself to those irreal possibilities that it projects as its potentialities. They enable the person to be in a world which is not the world she would be in had she, as she genuinely could have, made different choices. Given Heidegger’s way of conceiving the intentionality of consciousness, the world exists as Dasein exists (Basic Problems, 166; Gesamtausgabe 24: 237). By making itself be in the world, Dasein makes the world exist as it does. However, “to exist”is also used here in Heidegger’s technical sense. So—even though world exists only insofar as Dasein exists by fore-casting a world (Basic Problems, 166–168; Gesamtausgabe 24: 236–239)—nature can be without there being a world or any person (Dasein) at all (Basic Problems, 175; Gesamtausgabe 24: 249). The fact seems to be then that Heidegger was quite deliberately rejecting necessitarian ontologies such as that of Hartmann (cf. Robert Welsh Jordan, “Time and Formal Authenticity: Husserl and Heidegger,”in The Many Faces of Time, ed. John B. Brough and Lester Embree [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000], 37–65).
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Jordan, R.W. (2002). Nicolai Hartmann: Proper Ethics Is Atheistic. In: Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 47. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9924-5_10
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