Abstract
In this chapter, I shall address a number of developments that can be demonstrated in Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness in the L-manuscripts. Some of these developments link up directly with the exposition of the three models in the previous chapter, but all of them foreshadow the following part of this inquiry, which deals with Husserl’s analysis of time in the C-manuscripts. The developments I have in mind concern the role of protention; the structure of the phase of perception in which something is given as present now; the phenomenology of recollection; time as a principle of individuation; and the relation between time and the ego. The first two developments mentioned are linked to the exposition in the previous chapter of this inquiry
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Reference
Cf R. Bernet and D. Lohmar, “Einleitung der Herausgeber,” in: Hua XXXIII, p. XLVI. They emphasize that the transition to a genetic phenomenological line of inquiry already takes place in the L-manuscripts.
For a more extensive characterization of the difference between static and genetic phenomenology, see Bernet et al. (1993), chapter 7, p. 195–204, and D. Welton, “Structure and Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology,” in: F.A. Elliston & P. Mc Cormick (eds.) Husserl. Expositions and Appraisals, Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, p. 54–69. See also D. Welton, The Origin of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology, The Hague/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983, especially chapters 5 to 9. In these studies, Welton wants to demonstrate that Husserl develops a specific notion of perceptual sense, which cannot be understood in analogy with the manner in which a meaning arises in a signifying act. The context in which, according to Welton, Husserl develops this specific notion of perceptual sense is that of genetic phenomenology.
E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen and Pariser Vorträge (Husserliana Band I, S. Strasser Hrsg.) Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 19632 (19501). English translation: E Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by D Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
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Kortooms, T. (2002). The Perspective of Genetic Phenomenology. In: Phenomenology of Time. Phaenomenologica, vol 161. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9918-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9918-4_5
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