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The SLE in its Historical Context

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Part of the The New Synthese Historical Library book series (SYNL, volume 50)

Abstract

In the preceding Chapters, numerous doctrines and passages of the SLE were viewed in historical context. On that basis, the SLE was characterized as Aquinas’s statement of what he believed to be the correct moral philosophy that might be legitimately proposed in a commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics. However, the discussions permitting that conclusion, of their nature, militated against seeing in its historical setting the SLE’s moral philosophy as a whole. The present Chapter offers a partial remedy for that situation by proposing in outline form the orderly development of the doctrine offered by Aquinas as he moves through the ten books of his commentary.

Keywords

Human Agent Historical Context Moral Philosophy Moral Virtue Intellectual Virtue 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Clayton College and State UniversityMorrowUSA

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