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Free Epistemic Logic

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New Essays in Free Logic

Part of the book series: Applied Logic Series ((APLS,volume 23))

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Abstract

In the course of the development of epistemic logic during the sixties and seventies practically no principle that had been proposed as an axiom for the logic of knowledge was spared from critical objections1. Perhaps the only unobjectionable principle consists in the common sense truism that false statements cannot be known to be true, or:

P1 If some person a knows that p, then p must in fact be true.

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References

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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Lenzen, W. (2001). Free Epistemic Logic. In: Morscher, E., Hieke, A. (eds) New Essays in Free Logic. Applied Logic Series, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9761-6_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9761-6_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5915-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9761-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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