The Burden of Proof

  • Colin Cheyne
Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science book series (WONS, volume 67)


Suppose platonists could counter my causal objections and demonstrate that it is possible for us to have knowledge of acausal objects. This would still not establish the platonist position. First, I argue that the burden of proof is on platonists to explain how we do have such knowledge. Then I examine platonist attempts to provide such an explanation. I show that they are inadequate.


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  1. 1.
    Here, and in the following, I have paraphrased Casullo’s versions of the conditions for knowledge.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Carrier (1976, p. 250) and Lycan (1977, p. 122) make a similar point.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Maddy (1990, p. 45) points out that anti-platonists often make this ‘unspoken assumption’.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Colin Cheyne
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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