Beliefs and Causes
Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science book series (WONS, volume 67)
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In this chapter I explore various objections to the claim that for a belief to count as knowledge it must have been caused in some way. First, in this section, I consider the claim that many beliefs are uncaused and yet they can still constitute knowledge. If beliefs can be uncaused and if such uncaused beliefs can be items of knowledge, then both the strong causal condition:
and the weaker causal condition:
(SC) S knows that p only if the fact that p is causally connected to S’s belief that p,
(WC) S knows that p only if S’s that p was caused in an ‘appropriate’ way.
KeywordsRational Agent Free Choice Causal Chain Causal Condition Causal Theory
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001