• Colin Cheyne
Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science book series (WONS, volume 67)


There is a long tradition of regarding mathematical knowledge as a priori knowledge. But most detailed accounts in this tradition are not overtly platonistic and many are clearly not. In this chapter I examine three recent accounts that explicitly combine the claims that mathematical objects are platonic and that we can know a priori that they exist.


Abstract Object Mathematical Knowledge Mathematical Object Singular Term Mathematical Truth 
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  1. 1.
    My discussion draws on the criticism of Wright’s argument by Field (1989, ch. 5) and by Musgrave(1986).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Based on Hale’s version of the argument (1987, p. 11). It omits details concerning syntactic and semantic functioning, and Frege’s context principle, which I do not wish to dispute.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Janet Folina (2000, p. 327) makes a similar point.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Colin Cheyne
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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