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A Rationalization of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

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Rationality, Rules, and Structure

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLA,volume 28))

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Abstract

According to the standard account, strategies respond to various possible circumstances. I conceive them rather as responding to various possible future decision situations (including all internal factors). This is far more general since changing decision situations may arise in a foreseeable way not only due to information, as in the standard account, but also due to forgetfulness, endogeneous changes of preferences etc.

The main problem, then, is to state an optimality criterion for such strategies. This is a problem since maximization of expected utility then becomes either unreasonable or even meaningless (maximization of which utility?). The problem is serious, as the widely disagreeing literature on the issue displays. I propose a general solution by essentially referring, in a specific way, to a relation of superiority/ inferiority between possible decision situations (which is part of the agent’s view). This is the first part of the paper.

The second part suggests how this framework provides new theoretical means for dealing with the iterated prisoner’s dilemma thus allowing for a full rationalization of cooperation. The ideas extend to Newcomb’s problem and related cases and are hence relevant to the debate between causal and evidential decision theory.

I am indebted to Arthur Merin for improving my English.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Germany

    Wolfgang Spohn

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  1. Wolfgang Spohn
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Göttingen, Germany

    Julian Nida-Rümelin

  2. University of Konstanz, Germany

    Wolfgang Spohn

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Spohn, W. (2000). A Rationalization of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Nida-Rümelin, J., Spohn, W. (eds) Rationality, Rules, and Structure. Theory and Decision Library, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9616-9_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5463-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9616-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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