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Conclusion

  • George C. Christie
Chapter
  • 95 Downloads
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 45)

Abstract

In this book we have examined how our concept of the ideal or universal audience profoundly affects the style, form and substance of legal argumentation. That each person constructs a vision of an ideal audience is indisputable. It is also indisputable that for most people this ideal audience is, to use Perelman’s term that has also been adopted by Habermas,1 a universal audience. One of the themes of this book is that these visions of an ideal universal audience are widely shared. That is, it is not merely the case that we, as individuals, conceive the ideal audience as a universal audience, but that our individual visions of the ideal audience coincide with the visions of others. Some of these visions are shared among people belonging to a certain culture. Other visions are shared by people who, although belonging to different cultures, attribute certain universal characteristics to certain forms of human endeavor. Finally, we have seen that some visions of an ideal audience are coming to be accepted as truly universal and applicable to all types of human endeavor.

Keywords

Democratic Society International Criminal Court European Convention Legal Argumentation Legal Culture 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • George C. Christie
    • 1
  1. 1.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

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