Abstract
As presented so far, a strict conceptual role theory that rejects misrepresentation makes content blatantly holistic. If the content of every mental representation is determined exclusively by its use, i.e. by its conceptual role, hence in relation to the content of every other representation, then all the attitudes made up of those representations are (weakly) analytic and can be compositional. The meaning of the whole is dependent on the meanings of the parts, but the meanings of the parts are determined by the entire system. Misrepresentation is ruled out in virtue of the fact that there are no non-meaning-fixing liaisons in the conceptual system: all liaisons count toward the meaning of the representation in question, making every representation correct, and analytic, true in virtue of its meaning. Therefore there cannot be any misrepresentation.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Perlman, M. (2000). Analyticity, Compositionality, and Meaning Holism. In: Conceptual Flux. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9462-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9462-2_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5415-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9462-2
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