Abstract
Libertarians typically object to having the state deal with law and order for several general reasons: it is inefficient; it is carried out at the expense of taxpayers; and it punishes so-called victimless crimes.1 Exactly what the observance of liberty implies with respect to the treatment of tortfeasors and criminals is more controversial among libertarians. A pure theory of libertarian restitution and retribution is mainly what is attempted here, without becoming involved in general moral anti-state arguments. However, the pure theory alone will raise practical problems that require immediate response if the theory is to appear at all plausible.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto,Revised ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1978), ch. 12.
See J. C. Lester, “Liberty as the Absence of Imposed Cost: The Libertarian Conception of Interpersonal Liberty,” Journal OfApplied Philosophy 14:3, 1997; and J.C. Lester, Escape from Leviathan: Liberty, Welfare, and Anarchy Reconciled (Forthcoming Macmillan).
Bruce L. Benson, “Restitution in Theory and Practice,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 12: 1, 1996, p. 77.
Roger Pilon, “Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Punishment, or Both?” Ethics 88:4, 1978, p. 355 n. 13.
See Richard A. Epstein, “Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles,” in Randy E. Barnett and John Hegel III, eds., Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977); Peter J. Ferrara, “Retribution and Restitution: A Synthesis,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 6:2, 1982; J. Hospers, “Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment,” in Barnett and Hegel op. cit.; and Pilon op. cit.
Randy E. Barnett, “The Justice of Restitution,” in J. Narveson, ed., Moral Issues (Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 150; Mane Hajdin, “Criminals as Gamblers: A Modified Theory of Pure Restitution.” Dialogue 26, 1987, p. 85; Stanley S. Kleinberg, “Criminal Justice and Private Enterprise,” Ethics 90:1, 1980, p. 277 n. 9 and 278; Franklin G. Miller, “Restitution and Punishment: a Reply to Barnett,” Ethics 88:4, 1978, pp. 359–360.
Pilon, op. cit., p. 354.
Ibid., pp. 356–357.
Kleinberg, op. cit., pp. 275 and 278–280.
Rothbard, op. cit.
Hajdin op. cit. 81.
Murray N. Rothbard, “Punishment and Proportionality,” in Barnett and Hegel, op. cit., p. 263.
Hajdin, op. cit., p. 81.
Pilon, op. cit., p. 351 n. 4.
Richard Dagger, “Restitution, Punishment, and Debts to Society,” in Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway, eds., Victims, Offenders and Alternative Sanctions (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980); Richard Dagger, “Playing Fair With Punishment,” Ethics 103:3, 1993; Kleinberg, op. cit.; and Miller, op. cit.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Lester, J.C. (2000). Libertarian Rectification: Restitution, Retribution, and the Risk-Multiplier. In: Narveson, J., Dimock, S. (eds) Liberalism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9440-0_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9440-0_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5591-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9440-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive