Abstract
My general thesis is that law is formal in character.* Here I will suggestively develop how this thesis, applies to statutory rules, which comprise one of the basic, essential, and ubiquitous types of legal construct in all legal systems. I single out such rules because of their special importance. First, they are instruments both of problem-specific policy and values associated with the rule of law. Second, they are also used to shape and define virtually all other basic types of legal constructs. Thus, rules are used to shape and define legislatures, elections, courts, criteria of validity, methodologies of interpretation, the practice of stare decisis, official agencies, corporate bodies, other recognized legal entities, and so on.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See R.S. Summers, The Formal Character of Law, Cambridge Law Journal, 51,1992, p. 242; and R.S. Summers, Der formale Charakter des Rechts II, Archiv Für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, 80, 1994, p. 60. See also Chapters Five, Six and Seven of this book. See also the next chapter in this book.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Summers, R.S., McRoberts, W.G., Goodhart, A.L. (2000). The Formal Character of Law — Statutory Rules. In: Essays in Legal Theory. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 46. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9407-3_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9407-3_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5481-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9407-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive