My Philosophy of Law

  • Neil MacCormick
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 41)


I believe in law. That is, I believe that there is a distinct sphere of human experience which we can construct as a specific domain of understanding and activity, to which the name “law” is appropriate and hallowed by usage. I further believe in law in the stronger sense that I think human life, the life of human beings in social relations with each other, is enhanced by having for its framework (or a part of its framework) some body or bodies of law that stabilise our mutual expectations. Simply: there is such a thing as law, and where it exists it tends to improve the lives of those who live by it. Law exists, and law has prima facie positive value.


Moral Agent Corrective Justice Institutional Theory Legal Theory Legal Order 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Bibliographical Information

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Neil MacCormick
    • 1
  1. 1.EdinburghUK

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