A New Argument for the Existence of God: One that Works, Well, Sort of
The following is a new argument for the existence of a being who, if not the super-deluxe God of traditional Western theism, is at least a close cousin in that it too is capable of playing the role in the lives of working theists of a being that is a suitable object of worship, adoration, love, respect, and obedience. Unlike the super-deluxe God, the God whose necessary existence is established by my argument need not essentially have the divine perfections of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Furthermore, he need not even be contingently omnipotent and omniscient, just powerful and intelligent enough to be the supernatural designer-creator of the very complex and wondrous cosmos that in fact confronts us. Hopefully, his benevolence can be taken to be unlimited. My reasons for preferring to work with this more limited God is not just that I am able to prove his existence but not that of the super-deluxe one. It also involves, as will emerge later, the ability of the concept of a finite God to get around certain difficulties that confront the traditional conception of God as an absolutely perfect being.
KeywordsActual World Contingent Proposition Sufficient Reason Theistic Argument Scientific Context
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