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Many Kinds of Rational Theistic Belief

  • Richard Swinburne
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Philosophy and Religion book series (STPAR, volume 19)

Abstract

I shall assume that a belief being rational is the same as it being justified (that is, a believer being justified in believing it). I shall pose my questions largely in terms of justification, since “justification” is the more usual word in terms of which our concerns are discussed in contemporary epistemology in the analytic tradition. Epistemologists are concerned with the kind of justification which is indicative of truth. There is a sense in which one may be justified in believing one’s wife to be faithful, even when the evidence suggests that she is not — because of the instrumental value of that belief in helping one to continue to live happily or whatever. But justification of that kind is not my present concern. That is with the epistemological issue of the kind of justification a belief has, when in some way or other that is indicative of its truth.

Keywords

True Belief Justify Belief Externalist Theory Epistemic Justification Reliable Process 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Richard Swinburne

There are no affiliations available

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