Semantic Conception of Truth as a Philosophical Theory

Abstract

I consider the question ‘do we philosophers (epistemologists, etc.) need a theory of truth?’ ridiculous. Questions like this are applicable to practically any other philosophical problem: do we philosophers need a theory of perception, value, mind, etc? In fact, it is very difficult to defend the view that we need this or that philosophical theory. I restrict myself to the following confession: the basic stock of philosophical problems arose in ancient Greece. These problems have been elaborated by philosophers, more or less successfully, until now. It happens that some problems disappear, but others reappear or even appear as new. Yet some problems are fairly constant over the course of history. The problem of truth certainly has belonged to philosophical invariants, at least since Aristotle. It was reinterpreted by almost every generation of philosophers, sometimes with new insights. We philosophers are obliged, in a sense, to look at old problems from our perspective. I do not claim that semantics is the only contemporary perspective for the theory of truth, but certainly it produces a way of speaking on language and its relation to the world. So much for the general explanation of the title of this paper.