The Naturalness Theory of Laws
If I were to drop an apple, then it would fall. It is not possible that it would fly upwards. It is necessary that it would fall. I think these statements are true, but at the same time I believe that it is not logically necessary that the apple would fall. I believe that there is in nature a kind of necessity weaker than logical necessity: natural necessity.
KeywordsNatural Kind Essential Property Gravitational Mass Behavioural Disposition Logical Possibility
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