The Naturalness Theory of Laws

  • Martin Leckey
Part of the Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 14)


If I were to drop an apple, then it would fall. It is not possible that it would fly upwards. It is necessary that it would fall. I think these statements are true, but at the same time I believe that it is not logically necessary that the apple would fall. I believe that there is in nature a kind of necessity weaker than logical necessity: natural necessity.


Natural Kind Essential Property Gravitational Mass Behavioural Disposition Logical Possibility 
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  1. Ellis, B.D. (this volume [a]), ‘Causal Powers and Laws of Nature’Google Scholar
  2. Ellis, B.D. (this volume [b]), ‘Bigelow’s Worries About Scientific Essentialism’, 61–75Google Scholar
  3. Ellis, B.D., and C.E. Lierse (1994), ‘Dispositional Essentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, 27–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Leckey, M.J., and J.C. Bigelow (1995), ‘The Necessitarian Perspective: Laws as Natural Entailments’, in Laws of Nature, edited by F. Weinert, Berlin: de Gruyter, 92–119Google Scholar
  5. Tooley, M. (1987), Causation: A Realist Approach, Oxford: Clarendon PressGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Leckey
    • 1
  1. 1.Monash UniversityAustralia

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