Sensory Evidence and Shared Interests

Abstract

One of the most important differences between Quine’s and Davidson’s conception of epistemology stems from Davidson’s rejection of what he calls the third dogma of empiricism, i.e. the dualism between scheme and content, which in a later paper is subsumed under a still broader heading, i.e. the myth of the subjective (Davidson 1989). Both the dogma and the myth involve an illegitimate construal of the notion of sensory evidence. Indeed, if Davidson is right, the expression “sensory evidence” is a misnomer: there is no such thing as “sensory evidence”, and this is so for the same reason why there is no such thing as stimulus meaning (either shared or private). The “myth of the subjective” is responsible for Quine’s clinging to these ideas and this terminology. Accordingly, in the first part of my paper I will try to assess whether and to what extent Davidson’s criticisms of Quine on this issue are justified. The answer I am inclined to give to that question is a qualified yes: there are remnants of the “sensuous given” in Quine. However, I am not sure they are “mythological”, nor am I sure that Davidson’s diagnosis of their persistence is on the right track. In the second part of my talk — after offering an explanation, different from the one suggested by Davidson, for Quine’s adhering to the notion of private stimulus meaning — I will allude to some problems which, in my opinion, survive the demise of the notion of a conceptual scheme.