Abstract
It has been assumed that persons are beings who are reflectively aware of some of their own activities, and that control over behaviour depends on such awareness. It can be objected, however, that whenever a response of some kind depends on consciousness, it will also depend on the neurophysiological states/processes underlying consciousness. What it really depends on, it can be claimed, is an event having both experiential and physical aspects. And then it is always possible to assume that the physical aspects alone are what matter. For example, it may seem that you have to feel your hand in order to use it. But feeling one’s hand is caused by proprioception and processes in the brain, and it is the latter processes that really control the hand movements. The awareness is just a by-product. And — it can be held — not only is it possible to assume this — it is also quite reasonable. For how can anything that is not physical, control something that is physical?
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Vollmer, F. (1999). The Epi-Phenomenalist Problem. In: Agent Causality. Synthese Library, vol 283. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9225-3_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9225-3_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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