Abstract
Contemporary analytical philosophy is replete with philosophical distinctions. Such is, for better or for worse, the result of the systematically performing conceptual analysis in a piecemeal way. The results are not always enchanting. Very often, we find that some of those distinctions are not well motivated or that they could be reduced to other previously introduced distinctions. This was, for instance, the case with the so called distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. As Kripke has shown, the distinction turned out to be unmotivated as a semantic distinction, since it could be handled by exploiting already existing semantic resources such as the de re / de dicto distinction or the one between the small scope and wide scope of quantifiers.1 It could also be shown that if a language contains no singular terms, and if Russell’s theory of descriptions can be maintained, the distinction between de re / de dicto reports and the distinction between small scope / wide scope occurrences of quantifiers amount to the same thing. Philosophical distinctions can, up to a certain point, be useful tools for the analytical philosopher, but she must sooner or later be ready for a more synthetic approach. Otherwise, we run the risk of losing sight of the more general philosophical picture. By always looking at the trees, we run the risk of losing sight of the forest.
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Notes
Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference”, in Peter A. French et al (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1979, 6–27; see also my “Pretending to refer” in Herman Parret (ed.), Pretending to Communicate, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1994, 51–70.
I have attempted this in “A Sentential Theory of Propositional Attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 1992, Vol. LXXXIX, 4,181–201.
I try to clarify the distinction in a certain number of papers: “A Sentential Theory of Propositional Attitudes”, op. cit., and “Indirect Discourse and Quotation”, Philosophical Studies, 74, 1994, 1–38. I do not claim to be entirely original in these matters, but I never came across a formulation of the distinction in the literature that entirely coincided with the distinction I have in mind.
It comes from a distinction once introduced by Elizabeth Anscombe between intentional and material objects of our intentional experiences. See “The Intentionality of Sensation: a Grammatical Feature”, in R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, Second Series, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 158–180. The remaining part of this section can be read in way as an attempt to justify the introduction of a new terminology since, as far as I know, all the existing distinctions can be contrasted with the one I am now proposing.
It is fashionable nowadays to claim that “intentionality comes by degree” and thus to allow for different instances among which some do not involve any reflexive capacity on the part of the agent who entertains the so called “intentional” attitude, and much less first person authority. To a large extent, this can be only a terminological issue since, by introducing material reports, I am already conceding that an agent could entertain beliefs without knowing that she does.
It is interesting to note that by allowing for those two different uses, we implicitly impose strong constraints upon the resolution of the debate between naturalists and anti-naturalists. We are willing to acknowledge that an agent can have beliefs without knowing that she has those beliefs, as it is now often claimed by naturalists, but we are also acknowledging the fact that there are attitudes that do involve the phenomenon of first person authority. Any naturalistic account must therefore provide an explanation of this phenomenon, and it cannot so easily be discarded as it is very often done by the same naturalist philosophers. Of course, saying that there is such a phenomenon does not imply that we should endorse the traditional Cartesian explanation in terms of privileged access.
Burge “Self-Reference and Translation”, in F. Guenthner and M. Guenthner-Reutter (eds.), Meaning and Translation, London, Duckworth, 1978, 137–153.
Kripke, “A Puzzle About Belief’, in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1979, 239–283.
This is the phrase used by Russell in “On Denoting” to capture a similar kind of examples which allowed him to authorize exceptionally the substitutivity of identicals in belief contexts.
See Jerry Fodor, Psycho Semantics. The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, Bradford Books, 1987, Chap.2; Brian Loar, “Social Content and Psychological Content”, in R. H. Grimm et D. D. Merrill (eds.), 1988, 99–110.
Tyler Burge, “Individualism and Self-Knowledge”, Journal of Philosophy, 85, 649–663 ; Donald Davidson argues that Burge is unable to account for first person authority, but he thinks that his own externalist account is compatible with the phenomenon. See his “First Person Authority”, Dialectica, 3 8,1984, 101–111; “Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Proceedings of the APA, 60,1987, 441–458; “Reply to Burge”, Journal of Philosophy, 85,1988, 664–665.
It may be remarked in passing that even if we were to allow proper names to have a Kaplanesque linguistic meaning, it would not necessarily lead to a vindication of the descriptive theory of proper names.
Patricia Kitcher, “Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism”, Philosophy of Science, 52,1985, 78–97.
Samuel Guttenplan, “Concepts et normes: Wittgenstein contre Chomsky?”, in Daniel Andler et al (dir.), Épistémologie et cognition, Liège, Mardaga, 1992, 221–23 8.
John Lyons, Chomsky, London, Fontana Press, third edition, 1991; see the Introduction.
See, for instance, Burge “Wherein is Language Social?”, in Alexander George, (dir.), Reflections on Chomsky, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992 175–191.
Gilbert Harman, “Psychological Aspects of the Theory of Syntax”, Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1967, 75–87.
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Seymour, M. (1999). Two Concepts of Belief. In: Fisette, D. (eds) Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 62. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5_15
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