Abstract
Let me return to the original difficulty. The apparent fact that trust goes beyond, even resists, the available evidence seems to pose a problem for anyone who cares for truth at all. It is as if our tendency to trust others were at odds with the elementary requirements of intellectual honesty.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Baker 1987.
Ibid, 3. Also see Gaita 1991, 314.
3See Wolgast 1977, 197.
This objection was raised by an anonymous reader. —The question is actually answered already by the definition of ‘evidence’ offered above: what we call evidence is relative to what we see as true. —Lars Hertzberg, personal communication.
Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov. Dostoevsky is describing a court case involving questions similar to the ones discussed here.
It might be objected that we will both want to know whether my friend in fact is guilty. But this is not quite true. In a fair trial, the fact that conclusive evidence cannot be mustered is enough for acquittal. Similarly, the prosecution must establish that my friend actually broke a law, not just engaged in an objectionable action. In a friendship, on the contrary, it is typically not enough that one’s friend cannot be proven to be guilty of breaking a law. We will want to know he is morally upright. —Suppose I am not disagreeing with a court of law but, say, with another friend? Here we ideally ought to come to an agreement. —All we can do here is to compare our accounts of the situation until one of us, perhaps, changes his mind.
This point is from Hertzberg 1988.
Adler 1994; Govier 1993c. For an illuminating discussion see Coady 1992, 21–24.
Coady 1992, 147–151.
Also see Govier 1993c, 28–29.
11This is not to say there are no other routes to solipsism.
Wittgenstein, OC. The following presentation is largely based on the argument in Hertzberg 1988. For a classical treatment see Malcolm 1986, 201–235.
Gustafsson 1995, 47. My translation; emphasis in the original. —Also see, e.g., Wittgenstein, OC, § 344.
Wittgenstein, OC, § 162; also see, e.g., §§ 103, 105, 115, 329. Cf. Giddens 1991, 129, where a ‘substratum of trust’ is represented as a psychological condition of normal life. For my criticism see Ch. 8.
Wittgenstein, OC, §§ 96–99. Cf. Collingwood 1979, where the study of the ‘absolute presuppositions’ of thought is described as an essentially historical inquiry.
Wittgenstein, C&V, 73; also see OC, §§ 174, 629.
Cf. Baier 1997a, 121. 18E.g., Wittgenstein, OC, § 310.
Hertzberg 1988. Also see my own similar suggestions in Lagerspetz 1992a. —However, the views criticised below belong to Baier, not Hertzberg.
Baier 1986, 242.
Ibid., 244. Also see Baier 1994: 177, 195.
Baier 1986, 241. Also see Baier 1994, 195.
I am grateful to Dag Lagerspetz for making me realise this fact.
Baier 1997a, 119–120.]
Baier 1986, 241–243.
Bowlby 1969, 216–218.
Ibid., 181–182.
Ibid., 199.
See Wittgenstein, OC, § 105.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Lagerspetz, O. (1998). Learning from Others. In: Trust: The Tacit Demand. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8986-4_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8986-4_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4963-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8986-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive