Abstract
Both the Classical and Baroque formulations of consciousness, as well as their criticism in the eighteenth century, presuppose and take for granted, the fourfold, ungrounded ontic conviction of daily life as positing the “metaphysically real,” the indicational appresentation of which is extrapolated from ordinary, common-sensical experience founded on the ungrounded ontic conviction (in Husserl’s lingo, the general positing of the “natural attitude”). As long as the presupposition is in full force, the result of these formulations entails the distinction between the non-simply connected space of the gap rather than the “simply” connected space of daily life. Their confusion, or the attempt to substitute the former for the latter, lead to death, madness, prison.
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References
Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance, pp. 86ff.; the posthumously published essay of Adam Smith is found in Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, edited by W. P. D. Wightman, J.C. Bryce & I.S. Ross, pp. 176–209.
See above, pp. 135f.
Kivy, pp. 94, 95. See above, pp. 35f.
Kivy, pp. 96, 98.
Ibid., p. 100.
See above, pp. 218f. and Kivy, pp. 127, and especially 128ff.
Kivy, ibid.; Kivy develops his view pp. 101ff., and especially in Chapter VII with illustrations from Handel, Bach to Beethoven, Honeger and Varèse.
Ibid., pp. 99, 101.
Ibid.., p. 96.
Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §§74ff. (English translation by James S. Churchill, Experience and Judgment, pp. 298ff.)
Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 411 ff.
Above, pp.217f., 227ff.
Gurwitsch, p. 412. See also Kersten, “The Occasion and Novelty of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Essence,” pp. 73ff.
See Gurwitsch, op. cit., pp. 391 ff.
Maurice Natanson, “Existentialism and the Theory of Literature,” in Maurice Natanson, Literature, Philosophy and the Social, p. 112.
A typical example may be found in “On Multiple Realities,” Collected Papers, Volume I, p. 230.
See below, pp. 250f., and Husserl, Ideas, Book One, §§ 9ff.
See Kersten, Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice, §§90f.
See above, pp. 35f.
See Maurice Natanson, “Man as Actor,” pp. 333, 340 and 341.
See Dorion Cairns, “Perceiving, Remembering, Image-Awareness, Feigning Awareness,” pp. 259ff. for the intentive complexity of image-awareness in contradistinction to feigning-awareness. See above, pp. 35ff., 51ff.
See above, p. 237.
There are still other and non-feigning cases of the awareness of the non-presentive; for example, the awareness of something symbolized by a symbol, the awareness of embarrassment expressed by a blush or of a judgment merely expressed by a sentence. Cf. Cairns, op. cit., p. 261.
Making present of the non-presentive is at least one meaning of the admittedly equivocal term in Husserl, Vergegenwärtigung. Here we can only note that a feigned “world” is not ipso facto a feigned fictive “world”—a distinction as Baroque as that of the idea of the compossibility of Art and Science. Moreoever, it is a distinction that lies at the core of the idea of the “fable of the world.” As a result, the “poetics of wonder” is not ipso facto a “poetics of fiction.” Thus whether Mannerist prose works, such as Cervantes’ Don Quijote, can be regarded as “fiction” in terms of the Baroque formulation of consciousness is an open question which cannot be investigated here. Fantastic verisimiltude appresenting the “real” is not necessarily “fiction.”
See Gurwitsch, op. cit.., p. 393.
See Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §39 (English translation, pp, 167ff.); Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, pp. 389, 411f.; Natanson, “Existentialism and the Theory of Literature,” loc. cit., pp. 111 f.
See Maurice Natanson, “Phenomenology of the Aesthetic Object,” pp. 82ff.; “Phenomenology and Theory of Literature,” pp. 91f.; “Existentialism and Theory of Literature,” p.109. See also Jean Hering, “Concerning Image, Idea, and Dream. Phenomenological Notes,” pp. 188ff.
Above, p.238.
In the terms used here, the actor makes present, presentiates, the non-presentive feelings and conduct of Hamlet.
Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Imaginaire. Psychologie phénoménologique de l’imagination, p. 242. (The translation is mine.)
See e.g. Schutz, op. cit., p. 234.
Ernst Ansermet, Les Fondements de la musique dans la conscience, Chapter One; and pp. 142f. (The translations are mine.)
See above, pp. 222f.
Ansermet, p. 143.
Ibid., pp. 149f. (examples pp. 145ff.).
See above, pp. 209ff.
Ibid., pp. 163f., 165. The project itself is one of expression, dictating to the consciousness of music a “closed” melodic road and a completed “form.” Because of, or perhaps in spite of, the Sartrian framework in which Ansermet casts his examination of the consciousness of music and the imagining or feigning of the musical image, his detailed analyses of a very wide spectrum of examples remains valuable and worth concentrated study.
And these “analogues” or “correlates” in the life-world undergo real historical change, e.g., changes in styles of acting, singing, declamation, significations of words, punctuation, grammar, vocabulary, colors, perspectives, and the like.
Natanson, “Phenomenology and Theory of Literature,” loc. cit., p. 96.
Thus phenomenology is not a Platonism because every object is understood as the correlate of an act or group of acts (in the broadest sense) of consciousness, and this holds as much for material things as “essences,” “eidetic domains,” ideal possibilities.
For the idea of the transcendental phenomenological epoché as used here, see Fred Kersten, Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice, pp. 25ff.
See Fred Kersten, “The Constancy Hypothesis in the Social Sciences,” pp. 524ff. 532f., 538f, 546ff., 552f.
See Kersten, Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice, §§6, 7.
Sartre, Nausea, pp. 4, 10.
Husserl, Ideas, Book One, pp. 22f., 242f.
Above, p. 160.
Natanson, Anonymity. A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz, p. 138.
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Kersten, F. (1997). The Baroque Formulation of Consciousness In The Domain Of Phenomenological Clarification. In: Galileo and the ‘Invention’ of Opera. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 29. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8931-4_9
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