On Now-Ambiguities

Abstract

This paper is intended to be an argument, supporting a certain, temporal interpretation of possible world frameworks. It will proceed in three steps: First the need for such a theory will be motivated. This first step will take the form of a semantic analysis demonstrating how classical, non-temporal possible world semantics prove inappropriate when applied on a certain kind of modal statement — essentially modal statements that make reference to the present moment. Hereafter it will be argued that previous temporal interpretations of possible world frameworks, including Diodorian modal theories, do not have better prospects. The claim here will be that these theories either misrepresent the very nature of modality or, alternatively, fall short of a challenge raised by Arthur Prior concerning the truth-value of future-tense statements known as ‘The Assertion Problem’. Thirdly a new theory of modality will be presented. This theory has two main components: a metaphysical which is fleshed out in a model I have called ‘The World Model’, and a corresponding semantics which I have called ‘Divergent Evaluation’. Divergent Evaluation does, in contrast to semantics from non-temporal theories, manage to deal with now-ambiguities and, in contrast to previous temporal theories, it does this in a way that meets Prior’s challenge concerning The Assertion Problem head on. I believe these two advantages with the Divergent Evaluation reflect that the World Model, if not the true picture of modality, offers at least a more appropriate picture than does many of its predecessors.