Abstract
The concept of actual existence for properties (of individuals), i.e. for first intensions, cannot be defined in the way actual existence has been defined for states of affairs in DP31. There is no special one among the properties such that to be actually existent is for properties the same as being an intensional part of that special property. But we can reasonably say that a property is actually existent if and only if it is an intensional part of some intension or other of a certain type of first intensions; let us call intensions of that type “primary actualities.”
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Meixner, U. (1997). Actual Existence for Accidents and Substances. In: Axiomatic Formal Ontology. Synthese Library, vol 264. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8867-6_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8867-6_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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