Abstract
A normative rule (for example, “one ought to do A given B”) is defeasible in a normative system S iff S contains another rule to the effect that one ought not do A given B&C or one is permitted not to do A given B&C. In these cases the latter rules defeat the first one. We claim that most normative systems that are complex enough to guide actions in light of the fact that some rules have been violated will contain defeasible rules. For example, the Model Penal Code specifies straightforwardly that one ought not to use force against another person. Yet this rule is defeasible since the code also specifies that one may use force in self defense; that is, the rule is defeated when someone violates the rule not to use force. And the rule permitting force in self defense is itself defeasible since one may not use force even in self defense if one believes he is being restrained by a policeman (Nozick, 1968).
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Belzer, M., Loewer, B. (1997). Deontic Logics of Defeasibility. In: Nute, D. (eds) Defeasible Deontic Logic. Synthese Library, vol 263. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8851-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8851-5_3
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