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Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games

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Book cover Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 50))

Abstract

The issue of stability in majority rule voting games hinges on the existence or nonexistence of a game-theoretic solution for cooperative games known as the core, or set of undominated alternatives. The core is considered to be a “natural” equilibrium in that it guarantees that every coalition will achieve its maximum value given the actions of every other coalition. Thus, the core’s claim to stability is unique: because it predicts outcomes that are rational for every coalition, coalitions should have no incentive to deviate from the core (Ordeshook 1986).

Are we to believe that democratic institutions are fundamentally flawed, in the sense that no equilibrium in preferences is likely to occur, so that the outcomes of the political process are no more than accidental consequences of institutions or personalities?

[Schofield 1995]

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Authors
  1. Cheryl L. Eavey
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Washington University in St. Louis, USA

    Norman Schofield (William Taussig Professor of Political Economy) (William Taussig Professor of Political Economy)

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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Eavey, C.L. (1996). Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5800-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8767-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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