Skip to main content

Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan

  • Chapter

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 50))

Abstract

Since its establishment in 1955 and until August 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the ruling party in the Japanese government.2 However, there is a consensus among researchers that the LDP was not a single party in this period, but a coalition of different factions.3 Indeed each faction in the LDP has its own office, its own account system, and its own councillors, as if it were a party. Ishikawa (1978, 1984) has suggested that work on Japanese politics be analyzed from the viewpoint of the LDP as a governing coalition consisting of different factions. The size of many of the LDP factions (see Tables 1, 2, and 3) was in fact about the same as the size of many of the opposition parties, supporting the conceptual framework Ishikawa prescribes.

This chapter is based on work supported by NSF Grants SES-88-208405 and SBR 9422548. The authors thank Gregory Densen for research assistance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

English

  • Aumann, R. J., B. Peleg and P. Rabinowitz. 1965. “A Method for Computing the Kernel of N—Person Games,” Mathematics of Computation 19: 531–551.

    Google Scholar 

  • Billera, L. J. 1970. “Existence of General Bargaining Sets for Cooperative Games without Side Payments,” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 76: 275–379.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gamson, W. 1961. “A Theory of Coalition Formation,” American Sociological Review 26: 373–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Inoguchi, T. 1990. “The Emergence of a Predominant Faction in the Liberal Democratic Party: Domestic Change in Japan and their Security Implications,” Typescript: Tokyo University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kohno, M. 1992. “Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan,” World Politics 44: 369–397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laver, M. and N. Schofield. 1990. Multiparty Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leiserson, M. 1968. “Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games,” American Political Science Reveiw 62: 70–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Owen, G. 1982. Game Theory. 2nd ed. New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N. 1978. “Generalized Bargaining Sets for Cooperative Games,” International Journal of Game Theory 7: 183–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N. 1982. “Bargaining Set Theory and Stability in Coalition Governments,” Mathematical Social Sciences 3: 9–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N. 1987. “Bargaining in Weighted Majority Voting Games,” in The Logic of Multiparty Systems, M. Holler, ed. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N. 1995. “Coalition Politics: A Formal Model and Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 245–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N. and M. Laver. 1985. “Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments, 1945–83,” British Journal of Political Science 15: 143–164.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schofield, N. and M. Laver. 1987. “Bargaining Theory and Cabinet Stability in European Coalition Governments, 1945–1983,” in The Logic of Multiparty Systems, M. Holler, ed. Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shubik, M. 1981. “Game Theory Models and Methods in Political Economy,” in Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 1, K. J. Arrow and M. D. Intriligator, eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shubik, M. 1982. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wada, J. 1994. The Japanese Election System. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Maryland.

    Google Scholar 

Japanese

  • Inoguchi, T. 1991. “Jiminto Kenkyu no Fukugouteki Shiten,” Leviathan 9: 7–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ishikawa, M. 1978. Sengo Seiji Kozoshi. Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ishikawa, M. 1984. Deta Sego Seijishi. Tokyo: Iwanami.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kanazashi, M. 1989. “Habatsu-Jiminto wo Ugokasumono,” in Nihon no Seiji, Y. Sone, ed. Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kohno, M. 1991. “Jiminto-Soshiki Riron Karano Kento,” Leviathan 9: 32–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nakamura, A. 1987. “Seito to Habtsu,” Seito to Demokurashii, in Y. Iizaka N. Tornita, and N. Okazawa, eds. Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sato, S. and T. Matsuzaki. 1986. Jiminto Seiken. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yoda, H. 1985. “Jiminto Habatu to Nakaku Keisei,” Kokyo Sentaku no Kenkyu 6: 71–86.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Wada, J., Schofield, N. (1996). Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. In: Schofield, N. (eds) Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5800-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8767-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics