Stanley Hauerwas: Character, Vision, and Narrative in Moral Life

Abstract

A word of explanation is necessary at this point in our study. For, the moral theory to be elucidated in this chapter represents something of a sea-change relative to those theories considered heretofore. We have already noted that Hauerwas differs from McCormick and Ramsey in his insistence upon the priority of considering moral agents’ fundamental constitution, or character, as opposed to focusing upon the content of their specific decisions and actionguiding norms. Indeed, Hauerwas refers to integrity, rather than ‘rational deliberation’ or obedience to moral norms, as the keystone of moral life. He goes so far as to suggest that moral dilemmas or disagreements are what happens “when all else has been lost” — i.e., when the moral ‘vision’ of involved parties is so skewed by self-deception or lack of a communal `narrative’ that they lack the skill truthfully to see the situation for what it is and respond in a manner integral to their formed convictions and life plans. In a sense, then, Hauerwas’s enterprise will appear to some to involve a consideration of just about every factor in agential choosing and doing other than the sorts of abstract ‘values’ or ‘rules’ we have considered thus far.