Abstract
Van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism rests on the distinction between believing a theory to be true and believing it to be empirically adequate. This distinction in turn rests on an assumption which seems doubtful in the light of Goodman’s paradox.
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Notes
Cf. Fraassen, Bas van (1980). The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 12.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., pp. 57–58.
Cf. Fraassen, B. van (1985). ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’, p. 254, in Churchland and Hooker (eds.), Images of Science, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Cf. Goodman, N. (1972). ‘The New Riddle of Induction’, p. 318 in his Problems and Projects, Bobbs-Merrill Inc., Indianapolis & New York.
Ibid., p. 388.
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Johansson, LG. (1996). Van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism — A Critique. In: Cohen, R.S., Hilpinen, R., Renzong, Q. (eds) Realism and Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 169. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8638-2_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8638-2_25
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