Negation and Correspondence

Abstract

In the last chapter we examined Reinach’s conception of the judgment in terms of convictions, assertions and ideal propositions. We further examined the basic ontology which corresponds to his theory of judgment, and briefly considered the nature of evidence, without which no judgment could be justified. In this chapter we move on to consider Reinach’s notion of the negative judgment. We will be concerned to learn whether the correspondence theory of truth demands that we recognize negative states of affairs as obtaining in the same objective way that positive states of affairs obtain. We must also consider whether certain aspects of states of affairs can be reduced to aspects of concepts or propositions, as Chisholm and others suggest. The answer we find to this question will obviously play a major role in any evaluation of Reinach’s philosophy; for as we shall see in Chapter Three, most of the distinctions Reinach makes in both ontology and epistemology derive from distinctions he sees among states of affairs.