Abstract
When I went to college in the 1950s I became an Existentialist. The problem with Existentialism is not so much that, like Romanticism, it is a “disease,” but that, like Romanticism, it is an “incurable disease.” I became an “incurable Existentialist.” I am also sure that even before I went to college I was an Existentialist even though I had not yet acquired the label. The label itself was something I checked out of the college library. Never having mastered the card catalog system, and too embarrassed to ask for help, I found myself back in the library stacks staring at a series of bound volumes of University of Nebraska Studies. They did not look promising; for example, in the volume for 1951 I found several very long monographs on planting and growing potatoes. But bound in with the potato monographs, and what saved me from the a career in agriculture, was a long essay by Maurice Natanson: A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ontology. That essay made a lasting impression on me. And although it may seem irrelevant to try to explain how I came to realize that I am an Existentialist, or at least how I came to pin that label on my sleeve, and although it may seem unfair to remind an author of his first book, there is nevertheless an important connection between that essay and the present contribution to this volume. The connection is this: At the very end of his essay, Natanson says that “Sartre’s greatest achievement is to have returned us to the nexus of philosophical problems concerned with the ultimate isomorphism between human subjectivity and human reality. We are returned, then, to the profound core of Kant’s Copernican revolution and to the question: Can phenomenological ontology complete or advance beyond the Copernican revolution?”1
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Notes
Maurice Natanson, A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ontology (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, New Series No. 6, March, 1951), 114.
Eugen Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Teil I: Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre, hrsg. Hans Ebelin, Jann Holl und Guy van Kerckhoven; Teil 2: Ergänzungsband, hrsg. Guy van Kerckhoven (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988 [Husserliana, Dokumente, Band II/1, Band II/2]).
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La Phénoménologie de la Perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), i; English translation by Colin Smith, The Phenomenology of Perception (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962), vii.
Gaston Berger, Le Cogito dans la Philosophie de Husserl (Paris: Aubier, 1941), 114f., and 115, note 1. Berger’s reference is in the context of a somewhat different issue than that of Merleau-Ponty, namely whether the constituting life of the transcendental Ego has an analogue in the activity of consciousness in the world.
Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, hrsg. S. Strasser (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 103ff; English translation by Dorion Cairns, Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 69ff. The German edition contains as an appendix a commentary by Roman Ingarden, 205ff.
Ibid., 215ff.
There are still other ways of arriving at the same problem; see Fred Kersten, Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 276.
Ibid., 117–119.
Ibid., 119–133.
Maurice Merleau Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible. Followed by Working Notes, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Eye and the Mind,” trans. Carleton Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).
Ibid., 167.
Ibid., 186.
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Kersten, F. (1995). Notes from the Underground: Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In: Crowell, S.G. (eds) The Prism of the Self. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8408-1_4
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