Abstract
Controversies over prenatal human life also extend to the use of fetuses and embryos in biomedical research. These concerns first arose around 1973, when abortion in the United States was first recognized as a constitutional right, and reports surfaced that fetuses destined for abortion were the objects of experimentation, and that live aborted fetuses were being used inappropriately in research.
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Notes
For an account of these developments, see Fletcher and Ryan, Federal Regulations for Fetal Research: A Case for Reform, 1987; 15:126, 127 Law, Medicine and Health Care. See also 45 C.F.R. 46 (Subpart B-Additional Protections Pertaining to Research, Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and Human In Vitro Fertilization). This subpart requires the approval of the Ethics Advisory Board for projects involving IVF or embryos, but no Ethics Advisory Board exists at the present time, so no such projects can be funded.
Id.
45 C.F.R. # 46.210 (1987).
National Institutes of Health, Report of the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel, Dec. 1988.
Note 1 supra at 129–30.
The term "embryo" is used here to refer to all stages from fertilization to implantation, rather than technically more accurate terms such as zygote, blastocyst, or preembryo.
See, e.g., Handyside et al., Pregnancies from Biopsied Human Preimplantation Embryos Sexed by Y-Specific DNA Amplification, Nature 1990; 344; 768.
For an account of the ethical issues in embryo research generally and applicable citations, see Robertson, Embryo Research, 24 West. Ontario L. Rev. 15, 26–27 (1986).
Id. at 30–33.
Id. at 28–30.
Id. at 33–35.
Id. at 35–36.
American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 Fertility & Sterility 1S, 32S (Supp. 1 1986); Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 Va. L. Rev. 437, 44–48 (1990).
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 46; Robertson, note 13 supra at 504.
Robertson, note 8 supra at 35–36.
Id.
Id.
Aside from promises of one person to another to uphold certain symbolic values, etc. The point being made in the text is a more general one.
See Robertson, note 13 supra at 448–50 for discussion of symbolism.
At least where no other source of embryos is available to conduct the research.
Robertson, Fetal Tissue Transplants, 66 Wash. U.L. Rev. 443, 455–63 (1988).
See note 16 supra.
See note 1 supra at 129.
Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility: Medical and Social Choices 324 (1988).
Mass. Stat. Ann. c. 112 # 12J (West 1983). See also R. I. Gen. Laws # 11–54-1E (1981); N. D. Cent. Code # 14–02.2 (West 1989).
Minn. Stat. Ann. # 145.421–422 (West 1990).
If embryos may not be discarded, however, research on embryos that will be discarded is unlikely.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. ## 3203, 3216 (Purdon 1983).
New Mexico State. Ann. # 1978, 24–9A-1 (1989).
If the embryos were otherwise going to be discarded (which is not prohibited in either state), then one could argue that using them for research first would not harm them.
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986) (Margaret S. III); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38 Para. 81–26, #6(7) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1365–67 (N.D. Ill. (1990).
A state could solve the precision problems by specifying the exact procedures that could not be done on embryos or fetuses, rather than use these broad terms. Such a tactic would then raise directly questions of procreative liberty.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405–6 (1983).
Id. at 406–7.
37.
Here the information is necessary for them to decide whether to go ahead with IVF, and if they do, to have the embryos placed in the uterus or not transferred at all. Whether or not they end up with offspring may depend upon access to the genetic information in question.
Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376–77 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
See note 7 supra.
The proceedings of this conference have been published as Preimplantation Genetics, ed. Y. Verlinsky (New York: Plenum Press, 1991).
Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis of Embryos, in Verlinsky, ed, note 41 supra. See also M. Michael, S. Buckle, Screening for Genetic Disorders: Therapeutic Abortion and IVF, J Med Ethics 1990; 16: 43–47.
Id. at 8–12.
For example, some couples might object to abortion of a fetus with cystic fibrosis but be willing to deselect such an embryo for implantation.
See note 7 supra.
However, state laws against embryo discard (four states arguably) might prevent destruction of embryos found to be genetically defective on the basis of preimplantation diagnosis. See Robertson, note 42 supra at 17–22.
Diagnosis and disposition as a result of the diagnosis are two different things. The right to diagnose would not necessarily give a right to dispose, though it often would. See note 46 supra.
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Robertson, J.A. (1994). Two Problems in Embryo Research. In: Beller, F.K., Weir, R.F. (eds) The Beginning of Human Life. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8257-5_15
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