Abstract
I have said that utility is the degree to which goals are achieved. But what is a goal? And are all goals relevant? In this chapter, I discuss the nature of goals. My purpose is to show that the idea of utility as goal achievement is at least coherent and possibly superior to alternative views, such as the idea of utility as preference satisfaction. The concept of goal achievement that I shall present is designed to be consistent with the approach to utilitarianism that I have presented so far. Namely, our goals are what we want to achieve, so that we want others to follow rules that will allow or help us to achieve them. In asking whether something is a relevant goal, then, I shall have recourse to the criterion of whether we would want to endorse norms for others’ decision making that would facilitate (or not hinder) the achievement of the goal in question.
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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Baron, J. (1993). The nature of goals. In: Morality and Rational Choice. Theory and Decision Library, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8226-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8226-1_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4270-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8226-1
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