Abstract
The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger’s “devastating” phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of “fundamental ontology” in Being and Time, has almost been universally1 received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl’s original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger’s lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl’s phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, “offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,”2 will, if the conclusions3 reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger’s phenomenological “superiority” over Husserl.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
The one notable exception to this, the essays written over the years by J. N. Mohanty, will be discussed in Part Four of this study.
Rudolf Bernet, “Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 21, 2 (1990), p. 136.
Bernet finds that Heidegger’s analyses in these lectures not only contain a “correction of certain analyses by Husserl” (p. 136), but also, that they are “more phenomenological” Bernet, op. cit., (p. 147).
Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Phenomenological Movement,” in Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E. Linge ( Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977 ), p. 169.
Dorian Carins, Conversations with Husserl and Fink ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 ), p. 107.
Bernet, op. cit., p. 146.
Ibid.
Otto Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1987 ), p. 286.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” in Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, ed. J. N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985); pp. 60–61; “The Phenomenological Movement,” op. cit., pp. 157–172; Truth and Method, trans. and revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall ( New York: Crossroads Publishing Corporation, 1990 ), pp. 254–271.
See: John Caputo, “Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a ‘Hermeneutic’ Phenomenology,” Husserl Studies 1 (1984), pp. 157–178; Frederick Elliston, “Phenomenology Reinterpreted: From Husserl to Heidegger,” Philosophy Today 21 (1977), pp. 273–283; Friedrich-Whilhelm von Herrmann, Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981); Richard Schacht, “Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology,” Philosophical Studies 23 (1972), pp. 293–314; Timothy Stapleton, Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning ( Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983 ).
The unavailability of the Heidegger’s Marburg lectures at the time when most of the literature on the Husserl-Heidegger relation was written may explain the lack of attention to the issue of the critical relationship between Heidegger’s formulation of fundamental ontology and Husserl’s account of intentionality. Notwithstanding this unavailability, the philological inappropriateness of the tendency at issue here remains in my view.
Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), German text Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975); Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), German text Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979); History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. T Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), German text Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt am Maim: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979); The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), German text Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Logik ( Frankfurt am Maim: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978 ).
Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. E Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), German text Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Vol. 1 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, 2 Vols. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1982), German text Logische Untersuchungen, 2 Vols. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); “Phenomenology,” trans. Richard Palmer, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, II, No. 2 (May 1971), pp. 77–90; German text “Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Vierte, Letzte Fassung,” in Phänomenologische Psychologie ( Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962 ), pp. 277–301.
Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, “Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Erster Entwurf,” with Heidegger’s notes, in Phänomenologische Psychologie,op. cit., pp. 237–55; “Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel: Versuch einer zweiten Bearbeitung,” with Heidegger’s notes, in Phänomenologische Psychologie,op. cit., pp. 256–77.
It may be argued, on behalf of Bernet, that since the focus of his discussion is the lectures surrounding Being and Time,he is not obliged to consider their treatment of intentionality and consequent formulation of phenomenology—which is not explicitly hermeneutical—in regard to the methodologically hermeneutical formulation of phenomenology in Being and Time. However, this is hardly satisfactory in my view, since Bernet’s discussion takes the liberty of drawing the conclusion that Heidegger’s approach to intentionality is “more phenomenological” (my emphasis).
Bernet, op. cit., p. 145.
Gadamer, to some extent, considers this. See “The Phenomenological Movement,” op. cit., p. 131 and Truth and Method,op. cit., p. 244; For the most complete consideration of this, see J. N. Mohanty, “Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Husserl and Heidegger,” Man and World 11 (1978), p. 328; “Transcendental Philosophy and the Hermeneutic Critique of Consciousness,” in Phenomenology and the Human Sciences,ed. J. N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 109, and §§ 9, 12, 92 below.
Bernet, op. cit., p. 145.
See note 18 above. Cf. also Ludwig Landgrebe, “Husserl’s Departure from Cartesianism,” trans. R. O. Elveton, in The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl,ed. Donn Welton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 101 and § 39 below.
Bernet, op. cit., p. 147.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 150.
Not only does Bernet not discuss the implications of Husserl’s differentiation of intentionality in terms of “actional” and “non-actional” modalities, but, considering Husserl’s treatment of this as early as Ideas I,he inexplicably considers it among those issues which, late in Husserl’s development, were “imposed on Husserl almost against his own will” (Bernet, op. cit., p. 148). See especially § 24 below.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hopkins, B.C. (1993). Introduction. In: Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4226-2
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8145-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive