Abstract
There is a view about the history of philosophy in the last century and a half which has been influential at least in English—speaking countries. It runs somewhat as follows. In the nineteenth century, mainstream philosophy throughout Europe was Kantian or Hegelian idealism. Analytic philosophy came into being in Cambridge around the turn of the century as a reaction to this. Most British were swiftly converted, most continentals (‘Europeans’, as many British still call them) were not. The exceptional continentals (in Vienna for instance) who survived the Nazi terror emigrated mainly to America and joined the analytic mainstream, leaving the continentals (assorted phenomenologists, existentialists, Marxists, structuralists etc.) to their own devices. A great divide of method and interests separates the two ways of doing philosophy; clusters of characteristics distinguish them. Analytic philosophy is objectivistic, rigorous, logico—linguistic, ahistorical, impersonal, value—free, naturwissenschaftlich. Continental philosophy is subjectivistic, hermeneutic, psychological, historical, personal, value-laden, geisteswissenschaftlich. Malcontents on either side of the divide, conveniently associated with the English Channel, look to the other side for inspiration and may “convert”. One is either “analytic” or “continental”: tertium non datur.
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For its definitive history, see Wolenski 1989.
Cf. Verein Ernst Mach 1929, §1; Neurath 1979, 83; 1981a, 302. There can be no doubt that the historical section of this collective work was written by Neurath.
Neurath 1935 and 1981b, §2.
The later influence on the philosophers of the Vienna Circle of Hume and empiricism in general, spurred by the work of Russell, is part of the established picture and needs no comment.11Sebestik 1985, 104.
Findlay 1963, p.xii.
Of the views I put forward in this book, the only one on which I have substantially changed my mind since writing it is that of Chapter 4 in which I suggest Husserl’s essentialistic statements are best represented using a de remodal operator. For my present view see Simons 1987a, Ch.8.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Simons, P. (1992). Introduction: Central Europe in the History of Philosophy. In: Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 45. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8094-6_1
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