Abstract
Chapter 2 dealt with the Nash bargaining solution and its nonsymmetric extensions. The first characterization of the Nash bargaining solution, by Nash (1950), was based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. This chapter is a further exploration into the consequences of this axiom. This exploration is based on the concept of revealed preference, in the wider context of choice functions and choice situations.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Peters, H.J.M. (1992). Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed preferences. In: Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8022-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8022-9_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4178-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8022-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive