Abstract
How is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy related to his earlier one? Despite much discussion there is little clarity on that. So let us give it again some consideration.
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Notes
For details cf. Wolniewicz, B.: 1979, ‘A Wittgensteinian Semantics for Propositions’, in Diamond, C. (ed.) Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of Professor GEM Anscombe, Harvester Press, Brighton.
Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.113-4.114.
See Bühler, Karl: 1965, Sprachtheorie, Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart (original edition 1934).
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Wolniewicz, B. (1991). On the Discontinuity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. In: Lewis, H.A. (eds) Peter Geach: Philosophical Encounters. Synthese Library, vol 213. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7885-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7885-1_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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