Abstract
In the two preceding chapters the forms of socialism most commonly known and identified as such, and that are indeed derived from basically the same ideological sources were discussed: socialism Russian-style, as most conspicuously represented by the communist countries of the East bloc; and social-democratic socialism, with its most typical representatives in the socialist and social-democratic parties of Western Europe, and to a lesser extent in the “liberals” of the United States. The property rules underlying their policy schemes were analyzed, and the idea presented that one can apply the property principles of Russian or social-democratic socialism in varying degrees: one can socialize all means of production or just a few, and one can tax away and redistribute almost all income, and almost all types of income, or one can do this with just a small portion of only a few types of income. But, as was demonstrated by theoretical means and, less stringently, through some illustrative empirical evidence, as long as one adheres to these principles at all and does not once and for all abandon the notion of ownership rights belonging to nonproducers (nonusers) and non-contractors, relative impoverishment must be the result.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
On the following cf. in particular M. N. Rothbard’s brilliant essay “Left and Right: The Prospects for Liberty” in the same, Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, Washington, 1974.
On the social structure of feudalism cf. M. Bloch, Feudal Society, Chicago, 1961;
P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, London, 1974;
R. Hilton (ed.), The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, London, 1978.
Cf. H. Pirenne, Medieval Cities. Their Origins and the Revival of Trade, Princeton, 1974, Chapter 5, esp. pp.126ff; also cf.
M. Tigar and M. Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism, New York, 1977.
It is worth stressing that contrary to what various nationalist historians have taught, the revival of trade and industry was caused by the weakness of central states, by the essentially anarchistic character of the feudal system. This insight has been emphasized by J. Baechler in The Origins of Capitalism, New York, 1976, esp. Chapter 7. He writes: “The constant expansion of the market, both in extensiveness and in intensity, was the result of an absence of a political order extending over the whole of Western Europe.” (p.73) “The expansion of capitalism owes its origin and raison d’eetre to political anarchy.... Collectivism and State management have only succeeded in school text-books (look, for example, at the constantly favourable judgement they give to Colbertism).” (p.77) “All power tends toward the absolute. If it is not absolute, this is because some kind of limitations have come into play... those in positions of power at the centre ceaselessly tried to erode these limitations. They never succeeded, and for a reason that also seems to me to be tied to the international system: a limitation of power to act externally and the constant threat of foreign assault (the two characteristics of a multi-polar system) imply that power is also limited internally and must rely on autonomous centres of decisionmaking and so may use them only sparingly.” (p.78) On the role of ecological and reproductive pressures for the emergence of capitalism cf. M. Harris, Cannibals and Kings, New York, 1978, Chapter 14.
Cf. on this the rather enthusiastic account given by H. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, Princeton, 1974, pp.208ff.
On this coalition cf. H. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, Princeton, 1974. “The clear interest of the monarchy was to support the adversaries of high feudalism”. Naturally, help was given whenever it was possible to do so without becoming obligated to these middle classes who in arising against their lords fought, to all intents and purposes, in the interests of royal prerogatives. To accept the king as arbitrator of their quarrel was, for the parties in conflict, to recognize his sovereignty ... It was impossible that royalty should not take count of this and seize every chance to show its goodwill to the communes which, without intending to do so, labored so usefully in its behalf (p. 179–80; cf. also pp.227f).
Cf. P. Anderson, Lineages of Absolutism, London, 1974.
Cf. L. Tigar and M. Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism, New York, 1977.
Cf. L. v. Mises, Liberalismus, Jena, 1929;
also E. K. Bramsted and K. J. Melhuish (eds.), Western Liberalism, London, 1978.
Cf. F. A. Hayek (ed.), Capitalism and the Historians, Chicago, 1963.
On the social dynamics of capitalism as well as the resentment caused by it cf. D. Mc. C. Wright, Democracy and Progress, New York, 1948; and Capitalism, New York, 1951.
In spite of their generally progressive attitude, the socialist left is not entirely free of such conservative glorifications of the feudal past, either. In their contempt for the “alienation” of the producer from his product, which of course is the normal consequence of any market system based on division of labor, they have frequently presented the economically self-sufficient feudal manor as a cozy, wholesome social model. Cf., for instance, K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, New York, 1944.
Cf. R. Nisbet, “Conservatism,” in: R. Nisbet and T. Bottomore, History of Sociological Analysis, New York, 1978; also
G. K. Kaltenbrunner (ed.), Rekonstruktion des Konservatismus, Bern, 1978; on the relationship between liberalism and conservatism cf.
F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, 1960 (Postscript).
On the inconsistencies of liberalism cf. Chapter 10, n. 21.
Normally, peoples’ attitudes toward change are ambivalent: on the one hand, in their role as consumers people see change as a positive phenomenon since it brings about a greater variety of choice. On the other hand, in their role as producers people tend to embrace the ideal of stability, as this would save them from the need to continually adapt their productive efforts to changed circumstances. It is, then, largely in their capacity as producers that people lend support to the various socialist stabilization schemes and promises, only to thereby harm themselves as consumers. Writes D. Mc. C. Wright in Democracy and Progress, New York, 1948, p.81 : “From freedom and science came rapid growth and change. From rapid growth and change came insecurity. From insecurity came demands which ended growth and change. Ending growth and change ended science and freedom.”
On liberalism, its decline, and the rise of socialism cf. A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century, London, 1914;
W. H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition, 2 vols., London, 1983.
I might again mention that the characterization of conservatism, too, has the status of an ideal-type (cf. Chapter 3, n. 2; Chapter 4, n. 8). It is the attempt to reconstruct those ideas which people either consciously or unconsciously accept or reject in attaching or detaching themselves to or from certain social policies or movements. The idea of a conservative policy as described here and in the following can also be said to be a fair reconstruction of the underlying, unifying ideological force of what is indeed labeled “conservative” in Europe. However, the term “conservative” is used differently in the United States. Here, quite frequently, everyone who is not a left-liberal-(social)-democrat is labeled a conservative. As compared with this terminology, our usage of the term conservative is much narrower, but also much more in line with ideological reality. Labeling everything that is not “liberal” (in the American sense) “conservative” glosses over the fundamental ideological differences that-despite some partial agreement regarding their opposition to “liberal-ism”-exist in the United States between libertarians, as advocates of a pure capitalist order based on the natural theory of property, and conservatives proper, who, from W. Buckley to I. Kristol, nominally hail the institution of private property, only to disregard private owners’ rights whenever it is deemed necessary in order to protect established economic and political powers from eroding in the process of peaceful competition. And in the field of foreign affairs they exhibit the same disrespect for private property rights through their advocacy of a policy of aggressive interventionism. On the polar difference between libertarianism and conservatism cf. G. W. Carey (ed.), Freedom and Virtue. The Conservative/Libertarian Debate, Lanham, 1984.
D. Mc. C. Wright (Capitalism, New York, 1951, p. 198) correctly describes that both-left-liberalism, or rather social democracy, and conservatism-imply a partial expropriation of producers/contractors. He then misinterprets the difference, though, when he sees it as a disagreement over the question of how far this expropriation should go. In fact, there is disagreement about this among social-democrats and conservatives. Both groups have their “radicals” and “moderates.” What makes them social-democrats or conservatives is a different idea about which groups are to be favored at the expense of others.
Note the interesting relationship between our sociological typology of socialist policies and the logical typology of market interventions as developed by M. N. Rothbard. Rothbard Power and Market, Kansas City, 1977, pp.10ff) distinguishes between “autistic intervention” where “the intervener may command an individual subject to do or not to do certain things when these actions directly involve the individual’s person or property alone ... (i.e.) when exchange is not involved”; “binary intervention” where the intervener may enforce a coerced exchange between the individual subject and himself; and “triangular intervention” where “the intervener may either compel or prohibit an exchange between a pair of subjects” (p. 10). In terms of this distinction, the characteristic mark of conservatism then is its preference for “triangular intervention”-and as will be seen later in this Chapter, “autistic intervention” insofar as autistic actions also have natural repercussions on the pattern of inter-individual exchanges-for such interventions are uniquely suited, in accordance with the social psychology of conservatism, to helping “freeze” a given pattern of social exchanges. As compared with this, egalitarian socialism, in line with its described “progressive” psychology, exhibits a preference for “binary interventions” (taxation). Note, however, that the actual policies of socialist and social-democratic parties do not always coincide precisely with our ideal-typical description of socialism social-democratic style. While they generally do, the socialist parties-most notably under the influence of labor unions-have also adopted typically conservative policies to a certain extent and are by no means totally opposed to any form of triangular intervention.
Cf. on the following M. N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas City, 1977, pp.24ff.
While in order to stabilize social positions, price-freezing is needed and price-freezing can result in maximum or minimum prices, conservatives distinctly favor minimum price controls to the extent that it is commonly considered even more urgent that one’s absolute-rather than one’s relative-wealth position be prevented from eroding.
To be sure, conservatives are by no means always actually willing to go quite as far. But they recurringly do so-the last time in the United States being during the Nixon presidency. Moreover, conservatives have always exhibited a more or less open admiration for the great unifying social spirit brought about by a war-economy which is typically characterized precisely by full-scale price controls.
Cf. G. Reisman, Government Against the Economy, New York, 1979. For an apologetic treatment of price-controls cf.
J. K. Galbraith, A Theory of Price Control, Cambridge, 1952.
G. Reisman, Government Against the Economy, New York, 1979, p. 141.
On the politics and economics of regulation cf. G. Stigler, The Citizen and the State. Essays on Regulation, Chicago, 1975;
M. N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas City, 1977, Chapter 3.3; on licenses cf. also
M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, 1962, Chapter 9.
Cf. also B. Badie and P. Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, Chicago, 1983, esp. pp.107f.
Cf. on this R. Radosh and M. N. Rothbard (eds.), A New History of Leviathan, New York, 1972.
Cf. Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, Chicago, 1983.
Cf. L. v. Mises, Omnipotent Government, New Haven, 1944;
F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, 1956;
W. Hock, Deutscher Antikapitalismus, Frankfurt/M., 1960.
Cf. one of the foremost representatives of the German “Historical School,” the “Kathedersozialist” and naziapologist: W. Sombart, Deutscher Sozialimus, Berlin, 1934.
Cf. W. Fischer, Die Wirtschaftspolitik Deutschlands 1918–45, Hannover, 1961;
W. Treue, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Neuzeit, vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1973;
R. A. Brady, “Modernized Cameralism in the Third Reich: The Case of the National Industry Group,” in: M. I. Goldman (ed.), Comparative Economic Systems, New York, 1971.
The average gross income of employed persons in Germany in 1938 (last figure available) was (in absolute terms, i.e., not taking inflation into account!) still lower than that of 1927. Hitler then started the war and resources were increasingly shifted from civilian to non-civilian uses, so that it can safely be assumed that the standard of living decreased even further and more drastically from 1939 on. Cf. Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die BRD, 1960, p.542; cf. also V. Trivanovitch, Economic Development of Germany Under National Socialism, New York, 1937, p.44.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hoppe, HH. (1989). The Socialism of Conservatism. In: A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7849-3_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7849-3_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-015-7851-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7849-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive